Russian Foreign Policy

Introduction

This dissertation sets out to explain the complex nature of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era, from the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 and the accession of Boris Yeltsin to the year 2011 which has been marked by the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. When Winston Churchill speculated that the key to understanding Russia might be national interest, he could little have imagined the extent to which, more than half a century later, the foreign policy of the largest of the post-Soviet successor states would so reflect the perversity of human nature. Far from exhibiting an underlying if specific pragmatism, Moscows relations with the outside world have been liberally streaked with some degree of irrationality and dominated by fundamental dichotomies: continuity and change, consensus and conflict. Easy assumptions about a broader national interest and common priorities have been challenged by the politics of sectionalism and personalities, with rationality and logic acquiring multiple, contradictory forms. Attempting to conceptualize the foreign policy of the past decade is a daunting, perhaps even foolhardy endeavor. Apart from reviewing the historical flow of foreign policy development, this dissertation is set to analyze twists and turns of Russian international politics during last two decades as well as foreseeing the upcoming prospects in its relations. The essence of Russia's foreign policy is predetermined by the long-term objectives of the revival of Russia as a democratic free state and securing favorable conditions for the formation of today's dynamic economy, guarantee decent living Russians and the financial and economic independence of the country, as well as full and natural inclusion of Russia into the international community as a great political power with the long history, unique geopolitical position, sufficient military power, with significant technological, intellectual and ethical potential. The most important foreign policy challenges that require coordinated and sustained efforts of all state institutions of the country are the cessation of hostilities and resolution of conflicts around Russia in order to prevent their spreading into country's territory and guaranteeing of strict adherence of human rights especially regarding ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking population in the neighboring countries. The core task is also to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Russia. In accordance with a federal treaty concerning foreign policy and international relations, those functions constitute the responsibility of federal agencies and the federal subjects as autonomous actors of international and foreign economic relations if it does not contradict the Russian Constitution and federal laws. Russian foreign policy is based on the interests of both the Federation as a whole and its particular subjects. Such unity of foreign policy is the result of harmonization of interests and at the same time a reliable guarantee of their full support by the government. The transformation of one of the largest countries in the world in the direction of democratic development had radically changed global balance of political powers. Termination of the policy, which was marked as the confrontation of "two systems" with its projection on all aspects of international life, not only delayed the threat of global war and made the most of the accumulated warfare in an era of confrontation between the arms unnecessary, but also laid a new premise of the constructive cooperation on the regional and global levels , in the UN and other international organizations. Russia recognizes the importance of the concept of "new political thinking", which was the first attempt to overcome the deadlock confrontation. Russia had suffered from fascination with the abstract concepts of some kind of non-conflict globalism on the one hand and the preservation of outdated notions of opposition among "two systems" as a guideline for it's foreign policy. Despite the intermediate value of "new thinking", this duality of concepts have been the major reason of shortcomings and weaknesses in Russia's foreign policy. Democratic nature of the new Russian Federation made it possible to overcome this phase of uncertainty. It ended the struggle of ideologies. It's time to thy mind on of the needs of Russia, provided by the the economic, diplomatic, military and other means. This historical stage provides the foundation for equal partnership with its neighbors as well as with leading democratic and economically developed countries on the basis of upholding political and social values and interests through real interaction on the contrary of swings from confrontation to utopias in the past. The country is accumulating experience of mutually beneficial resolution of discrepancies and contradictions between Russia and other countries. The possibility is currently opening for practical consideration of the specific historical, geopolitical and economic interests of Russia in the framework of civilized international relations. The way world will turn up by the end of the 21st century depends, among other objective processes, on the success of Russia's reforms, on the strength of civil society in Russia and a federal arrangement, of its foreign policy. In turn, foreign policy can not be effective without strengthening the democratic Russian state and a comprehensive and realistic consideration of processes which are currently going on overseas. In particular this applies to the former Soviet republics, where the crisis phenomenon of post-totalitarian period directly affect the security of Russia, the pace and opportunities to overcome the economic and social crisis in the Russian state. Even if the most serious forms of crisis and national and territorial conflicts which were fueled by it, can be solved, the transition to democracy and a healthy market economy still would be painful and protracted process. The effect on the formation of foreign policy by the number of states of the CIS (The Commonwealth of Independent States) during the period of formation of independence is characterized by exaggerated distancing from Russia, fueled by nationalistic territorial disputes, including claims concerning Russia, as well as some kind of allergic reaction to anything that might resemble a dependence on the former Soviet Union structures. The understanding of the objective reality that rely on the policy of a renewed Russia facilitates the solution of national problems. But it will not come at once. Moreover, in search of their own place in the world community, some of these states, especially in the Asian part of the former Soviet Union, are trying to find a foothold in close to them in the ethnological, religious, or economic relations of countries, including those who fought in the course of history with Russia over the influence in the different regions. Thus there is a complex process of forming a closer circle of Russia's geopolitical environment, the outcome of which will largely depend on Russia's ability of political conviction, in extreme cases with the use of military force, its ability to assert the principles of international law, including the rights of minorities in order to achieve a lasting good relations. There is a complicated process of finding a new political identity which is still going on. In addition to the predominant traction towards the West and attempts to obtain guarantees of security and connect as a full or associate member of the West European integration structures tend to resume on a new basis of relations with Russia, a gap which, especially in the economic area, is exacerbating the difficulties of overcoming the crisis, the emergence of market mechanisms and the modernization of the economy. Following dissertation is aimed to analyze the history of development of the foreign policy of modern Russia, the mistakes it made and to foresee to a certain extent a further development of a country's international relationships. It is vital that Russia's foreign policy orientation would be based not on ideological or party needs but on the fundamental national interests. Russia should firmly take a course on development of relations with countries the cooperation with whom could be helpful in addressing the priorities of national revival, first of all - with Russia's neighbors, economically powerful and technologically advanced Western nations and newly industrialized countries in different regions. For start, it might be useful to review the priorities and principles of Russian foreign policy. The core of Russia's foreign policy is to ensure the realization of country's national interests. Within the framework of this fundamental problem the following key priorities are highlighted: provision of Russian security by political means in all dimensions, including the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, strengthening of stability along the Russian border, in neighboring regions and the world as a whole; protection of rights, freedom, dignity and well-being of Russians; guarantee favorable external conditions for the promotion of democratic reforms in towards the formation of civil society; Mobilization of financial and technical support for creating an effective market economy, the development of the competitiveness of Russian producers and ensure their interests in global markets, help solve domestic social problems; formation of a fundamentally new, equal and mutually beneficial relations between Russia and the CIS member states and other former Soviet republics, extension of the policy of strategic partnership and allied relations with foreign countries which had been the most successful in solving those problems which are solved now in Russia; It's actions regarding foreign policy are based strictly on the basis of international law, adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the CSCE, including the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of states. The boundaries may be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. Russia does not consider a priori no state or as a hostile or friendly like, but it comes from a desire to build by all possible means a good and mutually beneficial relationships, seeking for settlement of disputes and conflicts through political compromise and not conflict.optimal way for Russia to solve the problem of forming a security zone, and good neighborliness around the perimeter of its borders lies within the full stabilization of the geopolitical area around Russia and the establishment of zones of a constructive regional cooperation. For this purpose Russia intends to make the most of its foreign policy opportunities associated with this space in the functional and geographic regions within internal territory. Russia as a country - successor of the former Soviet Union and it carries the rights and responsibilities in the world stage surpassed to it after the fall of the Soviets. In consultation with other CIS member states, it contributes to the realization of the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union to the extent of which such rights and obligations are subject to it's jurisdiction.

GENERATIONS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINES

after the collapse of the Soviet Union a young Russian diplomacy could not boast with the experience of designing doctrines regarding international policies. The first conceptual constructions in the area of foreign policy were in fact derived from the theoretical framework that was available in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. Of course, it was necessary to change the words and ideas in order to form a decent policy. But it was easier than to change the logic of professionals and politically active public, which had been educated largely on the basis of a Soviet model. Perhaps this is why the ideological baggage of the first generation of Russian foreign policy doctrine is a reinterpretation of a selected Soviet ideas regarding this matter. First of all, there were two ideas: one of Lenin's time, the second from Gorbachev's era. The first thesis, adopted by the new Russian government and easily assimilated by the public, sounded as "the provision of a favorable international environment for building democracy in Russia" (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," 1992 / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 2. Documents / Comp. TA Shaklein. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 17, 21). He was in tune with the way Lenin proclaimed the main goal of foreign policy of Soviet Russia as fostering external conditions for the construction of socialism in the country. The second point was less archaic, but it also had not been innovative. It continued the logic of the "new political thinking" of M. Gorbachev the integral part of which was the idea of universal values. But while for the new political thinking the principal value has been the survival of humanity and its salvation from nuclear war, the new thinking "in Yeltsin's view" was regarded as universal interest assigned to the democratization of the world. It was assumed that this democratization is attainable through joint efforts of all democratic countries and since year 1991 Russia has reckoned itself as such kind of country. From this view the idea of "democratic solidarity" had emerged which had been viewed as modern and natural reinterpretation of well understood by the Russians old Soviet concept of "socialist internationalism." This phenomenon was interpreted in the USSR as the doctrine of the common historical destiny and the fundamental interests of socialist countries. Similarly, the "democratic solidarity" was pictured as an attractive hypothesis with the idea that all democratic countries (including Russia) will act in solidarity, with regard for one another, as befits the states with common interests. The idea of a favorable external environment for the sake of building democracy was more pragmatic. Hypothesis about solidarity of actions has been more impregnated with ideology. On the level of practice both of them intertwined. But once accustomed to perceive the world primarily through the prism of ideology, as was customary in the Soviet Union, the new leaders of Russia (Boris Yeltsin's entourage and the president himself) exaggerated the role of solidarity with the West, seeing it as a tool to ensure a favorable international environment. The latter required the new regime to survive, the destruction of the Soviet system and the creation instead of it some version of the democratic system. Diplomacy of early 1990s had to solve complex problems. It had to build a new Russia in a dramatically changed international environment, trying to minimize the inevitable losses. Thus occurred a difficult political and psychological problem. The Soviet Union acted as a unique actor and the main force opposing "global capitalism" on the world stage. New Russia had to master the role of a regular actor among democratic countries. Soviet citizens had been accustomed to believe that they live in "the world's first country of triumphant socialism." This was an important component of self-esteem for Soviet citizens, the foundation of its foreign policy ideology and notions of "universal and historical mission" of the Soviet Union as the leader of world communism. Nationals of the new Russia could not think anything of that kind with regard to their country. The new democratic environment, in which the Russian Federation was trying to "fit" has already had its own leader and its own "Messiah." The United States, like the Soviet Union, also saw themselves as a unique country - "the world's first victorious state of freedom" and "leader of world democracy." The balance of powers that existed between Moscow and Washington in the early 1990s, the problem of their rivalry in any sense, could not stand in the current environment. A key line of behavior of Russian diplomacy was "leveling" of the its positions on international issues with the positions of the US and Western Europe, which together with the reunited Germany in the 1992 officially proclaimed themselves as the European Union. The period 1992-1993 has been an amazing time. The Russian government has avoided to clearly indicate its national interests regarding foreign policy, identifying them with those of democratic countries, "the world community of democracies" in general. "Moscow strongly urged international partners - in spite of their lack of confidence - to recognize that support for the initiatives of the Western countries is the main foreign policy goal of the Russian Federation. A typical figure in this respect was the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Kozyrev". (Kozyrev, A. Partnership Strategy / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 1. Book. 1 / Comp. TA Shaklein. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 150-166). The logic of his foreign policy, based on the line of "democratic solidarity", is most clearly manifested in the behavior of Moscow during the initial period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1992). Russia unreservedly supported the formation of new independent states on the territory of former federation - first Slovenia and Croatia, and then - Bosnia and Macedonia. Moscow declared its diplomatic recognition of new governments of the former Yugoslavia together with the European Union, and before such declaration had been made by the United States. It is significant that Washington did not hurry with a decision concerning the recognition of new states, assessing possible complications in the case of anticipated opposition from Moscow and a potential war on the Balkans. Refusal of Russia to support the central government in Belgrade against the separatist Croatia and Slovenia was a surprise to many Western diplomats. But Russian leaders had their own logic. Having come to power under the banner of "self-determination of Russia from the USSR", feeling vulnerable to charges of aiding and abetting separatism in general, Boris Yeltsin sought to prove their strength and integrity. The actions of Russian diplomacy on the Balkans in the early 1990s had to demonstrate the consistent support of Moscow's principle of "right of nations for self-determination" applicable to all situations within the former Soviet Union and beyond. Within the country at this time the Russian government has led a risky game with the separatists, using them against a large part of the "pre Yeltsin" Soviet party and state elite, which kept the power in the Russian regions and did not trust Boris Yeltsin. Therefore, local nationalists seized power in autumn 1991 in Chechnya with such ease, and were trying to repeat the success in other republics of Northern Caucasus and the Volga region. The policy of decentralization, part of which was an extremely liberal interpretation of the principle of "right of nations to self-determination", in fact, helped Boris Yeltsin. Because of it regional elite, autonomous republics and economically prosperous regions of Russia eventually not only provided political support for the president, but also provided the necessary material resources in exchange for recognition by the federal government of their rights and privileges (including tax relief), which together led to a redistribution of power in Russia between the center and the regions in favor of the latter. Russian foreign policy in this regard and during this period was a reflection and extension of the interior one. By destroying the Soviet system in the country, the Russian government without regret has helped to break the remains of the old international order. The latter seemed to be part of the heritage of the Soviet Union from which they could safely get rid of, bearing in mind that every step in the destruction of this heritage in the Moscow interpreted as evidence of its commitment to solidarity with the West. Meantime, in the U.S and the EU the debate unfolded regarding a new world order and global democratic society. Being immersed in the internal turmoil in the first half of the 1990s, Russia could not pursue an active foreign policy. And it was not trying to do so. The growth of the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe (Central-Eastern Europe) and the former Soviet Union did not cause any protest or opposition. Russia not only expressed no concern about the proclaimed in September 1993 American concept of "expanding democracy", but welcomed it wrongly assuming that the program would bring her a direct financial benefit. This concept has proclaimed the most important foreign policy challenge of the United States to support democratic reforms and building democracy in the former socialist countries of Europe. Theoretically, this also included Russia, although in fact, virtually all U.S. assistance towards establishing democracy was addressed to former "Warsaw Pact" countries completely disregarding Russia. Just as an aid to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan in 1947 was intended to create binding of Western European countries to the U.S., the concept of "spread democracy" was supposed to solve (and it in fact did) this task in relation to the former Eastern European socialist countries. It has contributed to the total destruction of their economic, cultural and other ties with Moscow. Countries in the region shifted in economic terms to the interaction with the European Union, and in the political and military - in cooperation with the United States. The United States became the most influential political force in this part of the world, "intercepting " the role from the "old" European leaders - France and Germany. As a result of the concept of "expanding democracy" Russia has not received anything. However, the loyalty that it showed towards the U.S. activities in Eastern Europe, that meekness with which it perceived its exclusion from this part of the world, brought some of the winnings. U.S. and EU countries supported the requests of Moscow to the international financial institutions - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Large-scale borrowing from these institutions have been in those days an important condition for the economic survival of Russia, which since 1992 as a result of "shock therapy" of the Government of Yegor Gaidar was in a situation close to economic collapse. Characteristically, by providing concessional assistance to the Eastern European countries, the Western countries did not provide similar benefits to Russia. The financial and economic assistance was delivered to it on the usual conditions. For such a choice of the West there were several reasons. Firstly, it was important to complete the reform of small and medium-sized ex-socialist countries as quickly as possible and with the predominance of Western aid. Secondly, it was in the interests of international creditors to impose the large financial commitment upon Russia, interest on which, together with the principal sum had to substantially exceed the original loan amount. Lending to Russia does not seem a risky investment for international experts taking into account the export potential of its energy. Thirdly, accepted obligations to loans by Russia had given the international institutions levers of influence on the economic policy of the Russian government. IMF and the World Bank provided funds on such harsh conditions, that lenders have had the opportunity to control the actions of the borrowing country. The first half of the 1990s - is the time not only of the collapse of relations with former socialist countries, but also with the states of the Arab East, South Asia, Africa and Latin America. Russia 'left' part of the world - especially from those countries which where connected with military-political cooperation and geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union upon global leadership. This kind of diplomatic retreat has been explained in the country as a need for better use of scarce foreign policy resources. Outside Russia, this line was presented as a conscious move away from unnecessary rivalry with the West at the points that had no significance for Russian interests, but had a value, for example, for the interests of the United States and the EU (Latin America, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa). This period is connected with an important, meaningful innovation at that time. For the first time in history the subject of official bilateral discussions at the international level was the internal politics of Russia. The Soviet Union has always firmly adhered to the principle not to discuss the international negotiations regarding issues of domestic policy. All the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence contained provisions on the right of each country to choose its own version of the political system. This principle has been enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and many other international documents. n June 1992, Moscow took a step toward the demise of this principle position. During the visit of Boris Yeltsin to Washington the Charter of the Russian-American partnership and friendship was signed. In the preamble and several parts of this doctrine have been specified the principles which the Russian government intended to follow upon the conduct of domestic policy which stated its willingness to support the United States. These principles were identified as "democracy, freedom, human rights, respect for minority rights, including the national ones" (The Charter of the Russian-American partnership and friendship / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 2. Documents / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 442-443, 447). This was the first time in Russian history, when the document concluded with a foreign state, regulated provisions relating to public order and internal affairs of Russia. The Charter was a "code of conduct" to which the Russian government pledged to follow. In fact, Moscow has agreed to recognize behind the United States a right to be an informal arbiter in the evaluation of the Russian reforms. The literature sources has featured the phrase "homework" of Russia - it was a set of a moral and political commitments necessary to carry out internal reforms, which would enable to prepare it for a meaningful partnership with the West. The same document contained a provision on the "indivisibility of security" of North America and Eurasia: "Security is indivisible from Vancouver [Pacific port in Canada on Canadian-American border] to Vladivostok. " By signing the Charter, Russia has officially linked its national security with national security of NATO countries. In the understanding of the Russian government provision of its security now clearly conceived in the context of cooperation with NATO. It highlighted the formation of a "quasi alliance" between Russia and the United States. American politicians talked about the fact that the basis of Russian-American rapprochement is cooperation in the democratic transformation of Russia, the construction of a free society and market economy. For several years the idea of "democratic solidarity" between Russia and the West eclipsed controversy that existed in their relationship. wo years of economic disaster (1992-1993), crisis management, massive delays of wages, inflation, rising prices, strikes - all was attributed in Russia with a course of radical liberal reforms. The left opposition accused the president of neglecting national interests and implementation of policies that would benefit the West. The negative attitude toward the authorities exacerbated by the October events in 1993, during which the opposition to Boris Yeltsin was suppressed by force on behalf of members of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The first elections to the State Duma of Russia in December 1993 showed a sharp drop in popularity of pro-presidential forces and the rise of nationalist sentiment. Enthusiasm for the benefits of cooperation with the West, from which a liberal portion of Russian society was expecting effective help in the name of "democratic solidarity" grew weaker. There were growing doubts about the true goals of Western countries towards Russia. The Americans were accused of wanting to "take advantage of the plight of Russia." With no intention to change the foreign policy, the government tried to change the official phraseology. At the beginning of 1994 during the first speeches after the last elections to the Duma, Russia's Foreign Minister Alexander Kozyrev first ventured to say about "special interests" of Russia in the zone of the former Soviet republics. Although it was not followed by the activation of Russian policy in the CIS, the words of Minister symbolized a new trend: under pressure of public sentiment the administration began to realize the need to modify at least the ideological and theoretical component of foreign policy. The authorities tried to connect the logic of the "democratic solidarity" with the elements of liberal statism (liberal nationalism) with absolute predominance of the former. On practice, this resulted in the continuation of policy coordination with the U.S. and the EU. But now the co-operation was accompanied by reservations, and timid attempts of Russian diplomacy to accompany it with the nomination of certain conditions. Either Russia would become effective, including military and political aspects, tool of solidarity actions with the West, or it needed to clearly define the limits of rapprochement with it. In the first case, perhaps it was necessary to prepare for joint action with NATO in the Balkans or in peacekeeping operations in Africa. In the second - should formulate some kind of interaction rules that would restrict the behavior of both NATO and Russia. Meanwhile the reality of the mid-1990s became more controversial. In 1995 the war in Bosnia reached its climax. September of 1995 was followed by NATO's intervention in this country, which caused criticism in Russia against not only of the the Western powers but also Boris Yeltsin and A. Kozyrev, for their failure to prevent such actions. That same year elections to the State Duma which has already carried out under the new Constitution, showed a further decline in the popularity of the president and the growing popularity of anti-Western forces in Russia. In the West, new developments have taken into account in its own way, and in 1995 they started to openly discuss the prospects of NATO expansion to the east. In Moscow, this was fairly regarded as an attempt to exert pressure on Russia and the expression of the latent threat from the West. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1996 Boris Yeltsin had to go through the presidential elections, the chances to win which where were small. In this situation the government has made a deliberate and symbolic change: "too westernized" Alexander Kozyrev was replaced as foreign minister at the beginning of 1996 by Primakov, who had a reputation as a strong politician and moderate statesman. He was not ashamed of words about the need to defend national interests, but also made them a constant refrain of his own presentations and speeches from his subordinate senior foreign ministry officials. "Primakov, in fact, compared with its predecessor, began to speak more often about relations with its Asian neighbors - Japan, China, India and Arab countries" (E.M. Primakov International Relations on the brink of the XXI century / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 1. Book. 1 / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 179-195). He considered the collapse of relations with Latin America not justified. But being a realist, Primakov was not seduced over the the relation of opportunity between world powers and did not question the policy of partnership with the most powerful and promising of them. He saw his task as the minister not to oppose Russian interests in the west, but to teach the West the need to negotiate all the major decisions that affect their interests with Moscow. In 1991-1995, Russian diplomacy did not dare even to encroach on it. Diplomacy was geared to minimize the damage from the major international processes, in which Russia was objectively included, but in the regulation of which it actually took no part. It is important to note that the focus on partnership with the West have not questioned. The novelty consisted in the transition to a more active protection of it's interests by Moscow. The foreign policy of Russia in the second half of the 1990s, was no longer based on "democratic solidarity". The conceptual meaning of the Russian foreign policy of the second half of the 1990's is best conveyed by the phrase "selective partnership". This concept has had been focused on the preference of cooperation with the U.S. and the EU. However, it accentuated the spirit of Russia's hard bargaining negotiations with the West, defending its views and the right to determine in which cases it to be at one with its Western partners, and in which to distance itself from them. The new approach began to emerge during Primakov's term and remained with appointment of Ivanov who became foreign minister in September 1998 following the appointment of Primakov as prime minister. It seemed that a universal formula of foreign policy had been found. It was both pragmatic and principled. Principled because it did not put into question the vector of partnership with the West. Pragmatic - because the logic of "selectivity" (resistance or partnership) gave policy flexibility. Pragmatic because the logic of "selectivity" (resistance or partnership) gave this policy flexibility. Last years of the twentieth century turned out to be the difficult test for Russia's foreign policy. Having measured and estimated weakness of Russia after the crisis, West "as if on purpose" started to reckon with Russia even less. If the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia in 1996 could pass off as the result of concerted decisions of Russia, NATO and the EU, the conflict over Kosovo in 1999, had been intervened by Western countries in defiance of Moscow. In the midst of the "Kosovo crisis" in the spring of 1999 President Boris Yeltsin decided to make a principal changes in military doctrine of the Russian Federation. In its new version, approved in 2000 was stipulated the right of Russia for the "first nuclear strike" from which the Soviet Union voluntarily refused in the late 1970s. Russia and the West under the pressure of the experience of relations in the 1990s, got rid of the mutual illusions, but at the same time kept the relationship in a non-confrontational line, making use of new instruments and mechanisms. In 2000, the experience of Russia-NATO interaction of the second half of the 1990s was summed up in the "Russian foreign policy doctrine of the second generation, the essence of which has been sustained in the spirit of selective partnership" (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. June 28, 2000 / / Foreign and Security Policy of modern Russia in four volumes. 1991-2002. T. 4 / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. M. ROSPEN, 2002. P. 109-121). The rise to power of Vladimir Putin (first "preliminary" in 1999, and then "final" in 2000) did not immediately reveal the changes. In the media coverage coming of Vladimir Putin has been marked by a wave of laments over the "instability" of Russia's relations with the West and the growth of Russia-NATO differences. Under president Putin, Russian foreign policy has experienced a revival that contains elements of both restoration and revolution. Russia is back on the world stage, seeking legitimization of its new role and projecting power through economic, as opposed to traditional political-military means. It has revived a pre-revolutionary national identity stressing Russias unique path to modernity. Relations with the West have deteriorated as Russia has challenged agreements that were concluded in the 1990s when it was weak. The Putin legacy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is mixed; with gains in Central Asia and losses in the Western newly independent states (NIS) and the South Caucasus. However, unless Russia addresses its domestic societal problems its ability to play the role of a great power will remain limited. After a decade of weakness and upheaval, Russia returned to the world stage during Vladimir Putins eight-year presidency, regaining in?uence in its neighborhood and beyond, and venturing into parts of the globe from which it retreated after the Soviet collapse. Moreover, Putins Russia sought to revise many of the major agreements it had concluded with the West in the 1990s, when it was weak and had to accept an agenda imposed on it by Europe and the United States. This is the restorative aspect of the new Russian foreign policy, symbolized by its hosting the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in 2006 and its award of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The revolutionary part is that Russia is, for the ?rst time in its history, a major global economic player, especially in the energy ?eld, after years of strong domestic economic performance driven by high oil prices. It could become a serious outward investor as it is poised to dispose of potential sovereign wealth funds and as its corporations go global. As First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said at the 2008 Munich Security Conference, we dont export ideology anymore-we only export goods and capital (Ivanov 2008). Moreover, the Putin administration, by recapturing the commanding heights of the economy, created a system whereby the Kremlin is directly involved in international economic activity, blurring the lines between what is political and what is commercial. This new Russian reality expressed itself in increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward the West. Putins 2007 Munich Security Conference speech lambasted American unilateralism (Putin 2007a) and in his ?nal address to the State Council he accused the West of unleashing a new arms race and trying to gain access to Russias natural resources (Putin 2008). This rhetoric had a negative e?ect on Russias political relations with both Europe and the United States, although economic ties with the West became robust. Russia remains without allies, pursuing multi-vector policies. As Foreign Minister Lavrov explained, Russia will continue playing its balancing role in global a?airs. It will never be part of new holy alliances against anybody (Lavrov 2007). It seeks to ensure that no major international problems can be resolved without its participation and ability to in?uence the terms of the settlement. Russian foreign policy under Putin underwent a dramatic evolution, mirroring the domestic changes implemented by the president. Taking o?ce in the aftermath of the 1998 financial collapse and the pluralist but politically weak Yeltsin years, Putin restored stability to the country by reining in forces of decentralisation and competition, creating the power vertical, restoring control over the country by the Kremlin and its allied party United Russia, and recapturing state control over the commanding heights of the economy. He was lucky enough to preside over this restoration while oil prices skyrocketed from $27 a barrel in 2000 to $130 a barrel by mid-2008. Where under Yeltsin powerful oligarchs could sometimes pursue their own commercial interests abroad, under Putin foreign policy-making was recentralised. Indeed, during the Putin years, it became increasingly challenging to understand how Russian foreign policy is made. On many crucial decisions-for instance, support for the United States establishing military bases in Central Asia after 9/11, support of Viktor Yanukovich during the 2004 Ukrainian elections or turning off the gas to Ukraine in January 2006-the assumption was that President Putin himself was the ultimate decision maker. Nevertheless, it appeared that the domestic power vertical extended to foreign policy which was made by a narrow circle of people. To some extent, the emergence of Russia for the first time ever as a major global economic player was a result of forces outside the Kremlins control, namely high energy prices. In 2007, Russian economic output was 70% larger than in 1999 in real terms and Russian economic performance was considerably above what was predicted a few years earlier. Putin pursued a skilful economic policy for much of his time in office, with sound fiscal measures, the creation of a fund from energy pro?ts that could be used for investment in Russia and abroad, the early payback of Russias foreign debt and some domestic diversi?cation away from an economy based solely on raw materials production and export. Putin succeeded in one of his key goals-restoring Russias status as a great power whose interests have to be taken into account by the international community. This is partly a product of Russias growing economic clout, but also because the international environment created opportunities that Putin, initially playing a weak hand rather well, was able to use to Russias advantage. The major legacy of the Putin era that is in part a consequence of the brittle nature of the US-Russian relationship is Russias determination to revise the agreements of the 1990s, ensure that it never again signs up to policies determined solely by the West and insist that no major international problem can be resolved without Russias participation. If need be, Russia will do everything it can to prevent resolution of these issues, as the case of Kosovo shows. Putin improved ties with new EU members, largely through economic and energy diplomacy. He visited the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria and signed energy deals with them that guarantee greater Russian control of the European market. Thus, the European picture was mixed. Many of the new EU members have only recently emerged from centuries-or at least decades-of Russian and Soviet domination and remain wary of Russias intentions. However, dependence on Russian energy and traditional economic links remain, and Russias presence in Central Europe is greater today than it was in 2000. At the end of the Putin presidency, the West was more wary of Russia than it was at the beginning of his tenure. And it is questionable whether the highly centralised system that Putin has restored is really an adequate model for a great power in the twenty-?rst century. The domestic and international legacy of this sovereign democracy will outlast the Putin era, but it could eventually limit Russias ability to play the role of a twenty-?rst century great global power if the Kremlin does not fully address its domestic challenges and if it continues its confrontational stance toward the West. Following the breakthrough of Putin in the field of foreign affairs, the newly elected, by that time, president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev on August 31, 2008 announced the "five positions" of Russian foreign policy: 1)Primacy of the fundamental principles of international law. 2)Rejection of a unipolar world and the construction of a multipolar world. 3)Avoiding isolation and confrontation with other countries. 4)Protection of lives and dignity of Russian citizens "no matter where they are." 5)Protecting the interests of Russia in the "friendly regions." The highlights of Medvedevs foreign policy include the new European security architecture initiative launched during his visit to Germany in June 2008, a month after he assumed office, a five-day war with Georgia later that year, the subsequent statement on "the sphere of privileged interests" and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A gas war with Ukraine left part of Europe without heat in the middle of winter, but then Russia signed the "Gas for Fleet" agreement, under which it cut gas prices for Ukraine in return for an extension of the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea. Medvedev has exchanged words with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, against whom he even initiated a media war. In a surprise move, Russia approved military intervention in Libya but later said that it was a mistake. Medvedevs visit to the South Kurils caused a sharp deterioration in relations with Japan. His indirect foreign policy achievements include the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and progress in relations with Poland, although Vladimir Putin contributed more to both of these than Medvedev. Analyzing Russias activity in the period from spring 2008 to autumn 2011, it could be pointed out that its foreign policy was not the sole responsibility of Medvedev, but a joint effort of the ruling tandem, even though Putin stayed behind the scenes for the most part. A closer look at Russias foreign policy achievements leads to a paradoxical conclusion. Medvedev, with his friendly smile and pro-modernization rhetoric so acceptable to Europe and the United States, was widely seen as a pro-Western politician. Yet Russia has made hardly any advances on the Western front, while its anti-Western or alternative policy directions have proved much more successful. Medvedev has set out a policy which will be continued under Putin: Russia's transformation into a power with a regional focus, although the region in this case is Eurasia, which adds a global dimension. As a conclusion to this chapter it might be stated that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia endured a difficult rebirth into a unipolar world order where it struggled to find its place for some time. For some time it carried out the role of a dependent upon the will and interests of the West. This had been the most significant right after the collapse of the USSR. But with time Russia had found levers of influence on the global stage and now is becoming close to a status of major political force in the world. Russian modern foreign policy might be described as a multipolar international system, where a plurality of stakeholders shares the burden of enforcing international law and guaranteeing global stability. All three presidents had made a significant influence of the foreign policy of Russian Federation, although their methods and tools of influence differed depending on the situation. Having been left with "broken trough", after collapse of the USSR, Yeltsin tried to carry out the politics of non-interference and obliquely help its yesterday's sworn enemy to establish authority at what has been recent strongholds of social ideology. No one can blame him for that as it is in general the ordinary historical contour. Besides, Russian had to deal with the vast array of internal problems and preserving the leftovers from regime was it's natural and logical option. Putin managed to grope the strong suit of renewed Russia (natural resources) and utilize it as a tool of influence of the international arena. He wasn't an obedient lamb, the sense of authority is in his subconscious I recon (maybe because of his IS (intelligence service) past). Nevertheless, he propelled Russia on the qualitatively new level of diplomatic game. Medvedev was but a successor of Putin's ideas and trends. But his term brought some new directions of Russian foreign policy development. It began to pay more attention to Eurasia distancing itself from Europe to the merit of a economical cooperation. Russia is perceived not as a peasant waving red flag, but a bunch of suits sitting on the oil pipe counting profit. Is it for the best of worst the next chapter of dissertation will try to reveal. In general pubic eyes, Russian bureaucrats made numerous miscalculations in conducting international relations as initiating the military conflicts or speculating on natural resources supply and it may result in a unfavorable consequences. But at the same it might be the part of some major plan, which is unavailable for the public. Nevertheless, those events definitely are worth analyzing.

Overview and successes of Russian foreign policy

analyzing in the previous chapter various turns of state and foreign policy of the Russian Federation, it is evident that over the past two decades, the state had no direct and deliberate course of development. Having stopped be a world power in economic as in military aspects, Russia turned out to be crossroads and one might say, alone against the world. In fact, the whole of reality turned upside down for this one mighty state in the flash.newborn country had to cope and adapt to new realities in express mode. But the big bang did not happen, and Russia was looking at the realities of the new world through the prism of the socialist mentality. Situation on the world stage dictated the need to adapt, not to dictate terms. As the prospect of any increase of its own credibility in the international arena for Russia was not expected, it was necessary to at least preserve the basis of national sovereignty and security.at the initial stage of development of national policy, Russia has chosen a strategy of neutrality and non-interference in a certain processes of establishing and implementation of interests of American and Western European countries in the former Soviet Union's sphere of influence. The vicissitudes of the conflict in Kosovo and the relatively passive position of Russia regarding this issue had been discussed in the previous chapter. But this is only a single example, which confirms the caution with which Russia had acted on the international scene at the time. In fact, without specific direction of development, or at least the concept of how to act in this new environment, the promotion of their interests was close to impossible. At that time government of Russia has been fully engaged in the problems of internal character and foreign policy faded into the background to some extent.some extent, this position of Russia was justified because it minimized the risks to national security. But over time, Russia has returned a lost positions and prestige in the international community, and then the actions of this state on the international arena have become more diverse and critical.next chapter will analyze in detail all the fundamental achievements of the Russian Federation in the sphere of international relations. But it is not possible to achieve anything going error-free, at least it might be considered miraculous given the path of state development. In the past decade Russian government has made a lot of wrong decisions and some of them had a global resonance. Perhaps the reason behind those wrong decisions was the ideology of heterogeneity which shaped the foreign policy of Russia during this period, as well as an integral gene of monarchism, which is inherited almost by all the leaders of this country.the following pages will be allocated achievements and the main positive factors in course of Russian foreign policy. The analysis of these factors will be followed by failures and setbacks, which in the development of the country's happened quite often. The major achievement of Russian Federation is that over couple of decades after USSR collapsed Russia had regained its status as a leading world power. After a period of chaos and recession in the 1990s, Russia is now proclaimed to be back among the worlds leading authorities. Russia is still undergoing a process of transformation from a Communist party system to a state of law, to democracy and a market economy.has been achieved, although Russia has also experienced certain setbacks. Despite all warranted as well as unwarranted critique of its internal development or foreign-political positions, it has (once again) become a major power factor, it is a nuclear power, a permanent member of the Security Council with power of veto, and besides the US it is the only other state to maintain a continuous presence in space. It exports oil, diamonds and other natural and mineral resources. It has a developing economy and agricultural industry. Russia is member of the European Council and allocates one of its judges to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, to which every citizen of the Russian Federation may appeal. In elections and votes the majority of Russians have affirmed their constitution and governing political system.affirmation does not necessarily mean direct identification, but the predominant trend to look to the West and to take advantage of the freedom to travel to the West, which was evident immediately after the political transition in 1990/1991, has diminished considerably. Economic revival and stable economic growth have increased Russia's international prestige. In 2008 the political leadership of the Russian Federation has set an ambitious goal: to bring to the country to the level of "five" world leaders by the year 2020. The main reason for this apparent success has been a remarkable economic growth, driven to a large extent by the booming energy prices.last eight years of steady growth meant that Russias gross domestic product in 2007 reached the level of 1990. Today, Russia is the sixth largest economy in the world and a booming market. Russian experts say much credit must go to President Vladimir Putin, who imposed strict order on Russia's chaos and has pushed for free-market fiscal and social reforms. He was helped, oddly enough, by the collapse of the Russian economy in 1998, which punctured the overvalued ruble, ended the dominance of imported goods in Russian markets and all but wiped out political opposition to overhauling the economy.countries like Russia and other countries don't; some are helping it to spread its influence and others are resisting it. Its views now carry far more weight in the international arena than they did in the 1990s, when Moscow's opinion on international crises was generally ignored.goal has been achieved without a substantial increase in nuclear or other capacities, or not only due to such increases. Russia's increased importance as an exporter of oil and gas also played a role, along with the inclusion of Russia in the group of the most rapidly developing emerging economies (the BRIC, comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China).Dmitry Medvedev arrived on the world stage, the BRICS community has been given greater attention since Medvedev, strange as it may seem and contrary to the stereotypes of him that have formed, has paid significantly more attention to the non-Western world -- particularly to Asia - than Putin did. Correspondingly, he paid less attention to Europe, which I think doesn't interest him very much. So, during his presidency, the BRICS bloc was emphasized. They started holding summits. Under him, South Africa joined the group -- and Russia played a notable role in convincing the organization of the necessity of accepting South Africa even though the bloc didn't have any particular desire to expand. Formally, the organization has progressed quite a bit during this period, not least in terms of its appearance in the public sphere. At the same time, it would be a mistake to say that the BRICS structure has been filled with some sort of concrete content during this time.fact, BRICS didn't even work on those occasions when it could have stood as a united front and extracted some concessions from other world powers. For instance, last year when there was the discussion of the appointment of a new director of the International Monetary Fund, the BRICS countries had an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that they form a cohesive political force and are capable of putting forward a united position. But this didn't happen because all of them -- and Russia most of all -- preferred to engage in direct and separate agreements with the United States and Europe. So, for now, the BRICS structure is an empty casing that the participants are still trying to fill with something.more important factor was the rehabilitation of the "sick man of Europe," which many people did not expect to see. During the 1990s, Russia and many fellow Eastern European countries were called "sick men of Europe" due to the severe economic hardships of the time, as well as the soaring rates of alcoholism, drug abuse, and AIDS that led to a negative population growth and falling life expectancies. The Russian Federation had been in the grip of a steadily tightening mesh of serious demographic problems, for which the term "crisis" is no overstatement.crisis was altering the realm of the possible for the country and its people-continuously, directly, and adversely. Russian social conditions, economic potential, military power, and international influence were to the recent times, all subject to negative demographic constraints--and these constraints stand seemed only to worsen over the years. Nevertheless, the country managed to overcome those issues in the course of recent years. This factor has undoubtedly reflected in the positive manner on the international image of the state. Another positive aspect of the foreign policy of modern Russia had been the ability of the state to resist to the wave of color revolutions in neighboring states. When manipulations of public opinion during elections brought anti-Russian regimes to power in neighboring states, some people thought that this would provoke the dissolution of the CIS and an economic and political crisis in Russia.were disappointed. A failed "tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan, accompanied by chaos in the capital, frightened the local political elites and population but strengthened Russia's stance in Central Asia. The color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia lost their appeal following subsequent negative events there. Russia's foreign policy emerged as the victor in these crises because it reacted calmly to them, proving that sometimes it is better to do nothing. Despite the ambiguous relations with several countries of the former USSR, Russia managed to preserve an integration mechanisms (CIS, CSTO, etc.) and establish of new ones (SCO). Russia's policy towards the former Soviet states during the 1990s was unsustainable and bound to change, as became evident at the beginning of Vladimir Putin's first presidential term. The only question was what policy would replace it. It became clear over the last eight years that the majority of post-Soviet states need some CIS functions and mechanisms, and so they are being reformed.the same time, the military union of several CIS states - the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - was preserved, and Russia is changing the post-Soviet policy of supplying cheap energy to political allies. It is developing new relations with Kazakhstan and a new model of international cooperation in Central Asia, which involves not only the former Soviet states in the region but also China (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization).

The heritage of the Russian foreign policy and it's miscalculations

Russian history, the international situation has never been so favorable for a relatively peaceful internal development, as in the early twenty-first century. The absence of large-scale external threats, and who set in the twentieth century, and in the nineteenth century, and XVII, and XIII centuries into question which set the very survival of the nation of Russia and the Russian super-ethnos into question, perhaps for the first time allows a country to focus on issues of domestic policy. these circumstances, foreign policy should not be so much an instrument of self-assertion of Russia as a great power (although it is also very important), but the most important resource of national modernization, which is identical to the transition to an innovative type of country development. In this context the foreign policy activities of Russia and the legacy in international affairs, which fell to the new President of Russia should be assessed. In both official and expert evaluations the state of affairs in Russia's foreign policy for several years the incomprehensible euphoria had been dominating. It has been stated in particular that Russia's position in the last eight years had become much stronger (Putin's famous "hand of Russia grows stronger"), it supposedly became more respected, but do not liked by some states in the world, they say, because "it was again a strong and independent.

"This bravura fervor is reminiscent of the worst examples of Soviet foreign policy propaganda, pierced in recent years through the speeches of top officials of the state, the court "analysts", as well as all the official documents without exception, including a recent review of Ministry of Foreign Affairs' foreign policy and diplomatic activities of the Russian Federation "and the new foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation which Dmitry Medvedev approved on July 12, 2008".

( Lowell W. Barrington, Erik S. Herron, and Brian D. Silver, "The Motherland Is Calling: Views of Homeland among Russians in the Near Abroad," World Politics 55, No. 2 (2003) : 290-313.)there objective reasons to these estimates ? An honest and politically unaffiliated answer to these questions are unlikely to coincide with those panegyrics that have been give voice by the official and "unofficial" experts of the Kremlin. No doubt, in comparison with the early and mid 90s of last century, Russia's position in the world has improved considerably.this improvement was not the result of a successful, active and well-counted foreign policy, which has since been on various merits (and not in rhetorical terms) has not changed. Some improvement of Russia's position was attained by the two factors which it did not accomplish at all: the relative weakening of the political positions of the U.S. (due to the failure in Iraq) and the EU (due to a temporary inhibition of the European integration process) and a favorable situation for Russia on world energy markets. To be fair, it should be noted that significant role has been played by such factors as the internal consolidation of the Russian state, which began in the mid 90s, when world energy prices were not so favorable for Russia.one tries to describe the state of affairs in foreign policy in one word, then this word should be crisis. In this case it is not some marginal crisis or the crisis of Russian foreign policy in certain areas. The crisis is a comprehensive and wide-ranging, systemic and structural, developing both "vertically", i.e. top to bottom, and "horizontally", i.e. in all conceivable directions. It is simultaneously conceptual, institutional, resource, intellectual, technological and an image crisis. Moreover, this crisis is accompanied by a synchronized and increasing pressure on Russia by the major international players.for talks about the "pragmatism" and "multi-vector" foreign policy, which allegedly is followed by the Kremlin, it is obvious that statesmen are trying to hide behind those statements the obvious fact that Russia's foreign policy is formed spontaneously, constructed as a system of answers, rather than preventive steps, has no thought for the future, but is purely situational. Is it any wonder that in in the sphere of international affairs, Russia is still not widely trusted and considered unpredictable? The main thing is that in the event of continuation of this kind of policy, Russia is doomed for new defeats. Regardless of various statements, virtually none of the tasks of Russia's foreign policy of a global order, which were set in Russian Foreign Policy Concept and approved by Putin in 2000 had not been completed. It is important to analyze in this chapter the problems posed by regional foreign policy in the process of their solving Russia could have played a much larger role:

Development of good neighborly relations and strategic partnership with all states - participants of CIS as a priority area in Russian foreign policy, with the primary objective to strengthen the Union of Belarus and Russia as the highest form of integration of two sovereign states at this stage;opposition to the narrowing functions of the OSCE, attempts to redirect its activities towards the former Soviet Union and the Balkans in particular;of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in an effective tool of ensuring European security;of intensive, sustained and long-term cooperation with the European Union, devoid of market fluctuations;to NATO expansion plans;of existing human, economic and cultural ties with Central and Eastern European order to overcome the current crisis, and to give extra impetus to cooperation under the new conditions and Russian interests;

(Shlapentokh, Vladimir. "Russia as a Newborn Superpower: Putin as the Lord of Oil and," #18 - Johnsons Russia List, 9 February 2006.)

Development of relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the stream of good neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation;the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, resistance to the dismemberment of the state, which is fraught with danger of a pan-Balkan conflict with unpredictable consequences;of considerable difficulties in the recent relations with the United States, which primarily concerns problems of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as preventing and resolving the most dangerous regional conflicts;the participation of Russia in the main integration structures of the Asia-Pacific region, the APEC forum in particular;of friendly relations with the leading Asian states, especially China and India;development of relations with Japan in order to achieve a true good neighborliness that meets the national interests of both countries, registration of the internationally recognized border between the two countries.

(Trenin, Dmitri. "Reading Russia Right," Policy Brief #42 Special Edition. October 2005.://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17619&prog=zru (accessed December 2005).regard to the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russian policy was simply a failure. Russia not only failed to achieve any breakthrough (though such a task were assigned by Vladimir Putin), but had to back down on all issues, without exception. Prospect of integration have been lost not only with some individual countries - be it Georgia, Ukraine or Belarus - the prospect of integration was lost in this area in general. The situation in this area has worsened especially after Putin's statement that the CIS, had no hope, and from the very beginning it was conceived as a "civilized divorce process." In response to the crisis of the integration project in the post-Soviet space, the Kremlin's desire to "write off" the collapse of the CIS on some external forces rather than conducting an in-depth analysis of the situation is is especially alarming.doubt, these forces have played its role. However, all these "orange revolution" had an objective character, as they were a form of protest against the bankrupt and corrupt post-Soviet regimes that, contrary to Russia's national interests, Kremlin was trying to save. Russia did not even managed to withdraw from military-political threat near its borders over the years, which convincingly demonstrated in the Georgia-South Ossetia military conflict in August 2008 in which it has been literally plunged. It is necessary to ascertain that around Russia has been forming,with external support, a hostile military-political environment.the European direction. Russia did not succeed in stopping the trend towards a narrowing of the OSCE functions (indeed, over the past eight years it has evolved substantially in an anti-Russian organization), neither enlargement or erosion of the CFE Treaty (Russia suspended its participation in this Agreement). Relations with the EU (not with individual countries - Germany and France - and with the EU in general) have now been the worst in the last 20 years. They are clearly came to a state of serious decline, especially after the events that occurred in 2004 in Ukraine.the end of 2006 Agreement between the EU and Russia regarding Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) has expired and the new agreement still failed to develop. In this situation talks about the four common spaces of the Wider Europe seems rather vague and, frankly unpromising. Pompous ritual of signing of the "road maps", did not change this bleak picture. In Europe once again been talks about the dividing lines, and this line is now on the border of Ukraine and Russia, which was the subject of derogatory comments and jokes from the main European elites as from the public, and at the state level.some time it began to be treated as a "sick man of Europe". The very identity of Russia has been increasingly questioned by the European civilization. With the arrival of the new management in Germany and in France the tripartite mechanism for political consultations namely Berlin-Paris-Moscow has been completely destroyed. Russian-British political relations are still in a complete deadlock. With regard to NATO Russia have continued over the past eight years (and still do) to tread on the same rake as the Yeltsin administration did. First, Putin (as Yeltsin did in 1992) proclaimed Russian readiness to join NATO.received "an evasive answer" from Washington, Russia started to categorically oppose the admission to its ranks countries of CEE and the Baltics. Thus, Russia has pushed with their own hands an integration into of those countries in the alliance, provoking (or at least accelerating), the second wave of NATO enlargement. At the same time it went on to create a new body of interaction with this military alliance - NATO-Russia Council, as if oblivious of the fact that the same structure has been established after the first wave of expansion in 1997. As expected, the new structure was just as ineffective as the old.the moment Russia is on the eve of the third wave of NATO enlargement to the East (at the expense of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova). It is clear that the proposal Medvedev had made on 5 June 2008 in Berlin at a meeting with representatives of political, parliamentary and social circles of Germany regarding the development and conclusion "of a legally binding treaty on European security," is essentially identical proposal to abolish NATO and it did not earn any enthusiasm on the part of European partners of Russia. The conclusion of this contract in the current political situation is just not realistic. Of course, a direct military threat from NATO is close to a zero. But if the mechanism for a real partnership between NATO and Russia won't be worked out (and this is still not happening), there will be a third wave of its enlargement, the dividing line between Europe and Russia will take place on the border of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, which would mean a complete failure our European policy.for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with their entry into the European structures of security and economic cooperation (NATO and the EU), they became the subjects of anti-Russian attitude, largely determine the of these hostile policies of these structures towards Moscow. Russian relations with the Baltic countries and Poland are going through especially serious crisis. The task of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to counter the dismemberment of this state, which is fraught with the threat of a pan-Balkan conflict with unpredictable consequences has not been resolved and although it has been staged in 2000. Now after events in 2008 in Kosovo, it became apparent that a similar mechanism may be started at any time for any separatist neoplasms, if deem advantageous to the United States.can hardly say that Russia have achieved any success in the American sector. Full-fledged Russian-American relations are yet to happen. One would probably call a success the currently developing Russian-Chinese relations. However, many of politicians and experts still question whether the gains in these relations are bought mostly at the cost of Russian territorial concessions? In their opinion, according to the Treaty on the boundary settlement, signed in 2004, Russia had given away two large islands to China frontier - Great Ussuri (most of it) and Tarabarov. The total area of land ceded to China totaled at 337 square kilometers. If such problems arise it means that our foreign ministry did not bother at least to submit a coherent explanation for this crucial matter.addition, the structure of Russian - Chinese trade and economic relations over the past 20 years has not changed essentially: Russia continue to supply China with weapons, energy resources and modern technologies, the Chinese are in response overwhelm Russia with low-quality consumer goods. And if from 1945 until the collapse of the Great of Russia in those bilateral relations Soviet Union informally (and even quite officially) firmly held the position of "elder brother", and in the 90 years it has been, at best, the relationship of "equal brothers" today, it seems that China has quietly become "big brother". These relationship is largely preserved by the fact that the vector of foreign policy activity of China is directed to the South now rather than to the North. However, this does not bode well for Russia. If China will intensifying its efforts to reclaim Taiwan, it will cause an acute crisis in China-US and China-Japanese relations.a development is unlikely to meet Russia's interests because it would mean a sharp destabilization of the entire Asia-Pacific region with consequences which would be hard to predict. The Russian-Japanese political relations (on the background of a very small recovery of economic relations) today are still at zero. And there are currently no signs of even long-term prospects for normalization, this was the fact that Dmitry Medvedev was has been forced to acknowledge in his interview to journalists of the "Group of Eight" on 3rd of July 2008.task of "clearance of an internationally recognized border between the two countries" ( Trenin, Dmitri. "Russias Foreign and Security Policy Under Putin," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.) which was set to achieve in 2000 has not been resolved yet. Repeated attempts of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to resolve the territorial issue ended with chronic embarrassment. Is it not a sign of complete failure of Russian (also Japanese) foreign policy elite? Of course, all these problems of Russia's foreign policy did not arise overnight. They have been accumulating for a long time, ever since 1991.yet fatal as well as critical for Russia's foreign policy were the years 2004-2008: it is difficult to find even one such period in Russian history, when Russia got so many slaps, kicks and knockdowns. Equally shameful, perhaps, only have been years after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War (1856). However, this failure lasted only a few years: Russia had quickly won back its geopolitical position, and regained its international prestige the over the course of next few years after the war.it is obvious that humiliation of Russia by the "international community" continues for more than 20 years of an era of new Russian statehood. At the same time professionalism of domestic diplomatic corps is beyond doubt. As has been evident to everyone that it is quite a different matter. What are the main reasons for the deep crisis of Russian foreign policy?

Reasons behind crisis

of all, this crisis has a conceptual nature. This means that currently Russia does not have a viable and realistic conception of foreign policy. The concept approved by Vladimir Putin in 2000 contained many correct conclusions and regulations. However in general it is certainly out of date. Unfortunately, the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by Dmitry Medvedev on July 12, 2008 had no sense of "breakthrough" in it - at the very beginning of the document was stipulated that it was merely "complements and builds upon the provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by the President of the Russian Federation on June 28, 2000.new concept contains three key theses: emphasis was made on the comprehensive strengthening of international law as the basis of interstate relations and the formation of the international security system, reliance on the UN and its Security Council as non-alternative international organization endowed with a unique legitimacy, and the task of reducing the force factor in international relations with simultaneous enhancement of strategic and regional stability. Of course, all these tasks are noble and imbued with high moral and ethical fervor, which by itself should be welcomed. Another question is how do they relate with the modern realities of global politics.history of international relations, for example, shows that international law is not so much a set of some abstract, albeit noble, principles of conduct in foreign policy as the fixation of existing balance of power in the world at present moment. In the context of consideration of the following matter it would be useful to revise briefly the facts from the history. Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which was concluded after the Thirty Years' War, stated the defeat of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation and the papacy - the two major actors in world politics that shaped it before. Under the terms of this agreement, France has secured a dominant position in Europe for 150 years, pushing a minor role to the Spanish monarchy.the defeat of Napoleonic France in 1812 the Russian Empire had secured the leading positions for several decades ahead which was enshrined in the documents of the Congress of Vienna and in the international configuration of Sacred Union. After Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1954-1956,. new balance of forces has been fixed in the documents of the Paris Congress under the terms of which Russia lost its leading position. The Frankfurt peace of the year 1971 noted the weakening of France and a major strengthening of Germany unified by the "Iron Chancellor" O.Bismark. Treaty of Versailles in 1918 meant the consolidation in international law, including the League of Nations, a new correlation of forces: Germany as a defeated country was forced to agree to a humiliating position in the international system for itself. The Ottoman Empire was abolished, and the first position were occupied by Britain, France and the United States. After the Second World War two countries - the USSR and the USA - made their appearance in the league of "superpowers" .was enshrined in the postwar settlement documents, including UN documents (at the formal equality of all five permanent Security Council members - the USSR, USA, China, Britain and France). It is obvious that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the world has developed a new correlation of forces, which no longer reflected the main provisions of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. Under these conditions the documents signed in 1945 could no longer been the sole source of international law and insisting on this is pointless and counterproductive.can, of course, condemn unilateralism of the U.S. particularly in Yugoslavia and Iraq but it only illustrates the destruction of international law, which had been developed over 60 years ago and fixed the balance of power on the international arena. An appeal to this international law (the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation contains 22 mentions of that) is a sign of weakness not of strength. It is equally meaningless to stress on the exceptional role of the United Nations (this is done in the Concept up to 23 times) in the process of construction of a new system of international security.effectiveness and credibility of this mechanism decreases from year to year for quite obvious reasons: an anachronism of its procedures, including procedures for decision-making in the Security Council has become increasingly evident. Attempts to reform this organization at this stage has completely failed. Finally, we can not accept the call for the reduction of force factor in international relations as politically promising: on the contrary, there is a tendency to an increase of this factor, including the factor of military force., it should be stated that all three of the fundamental thesis of the new Concept, approved by the third President of Russia - an appeal to the strengthening of international law, the authority of the UN and the reduction of the power factor in world politics - unfortunately, are poorly realizable under present conditions and, therefore, can not serve as a convincing indication of whether any foreign growth potential of Russia is present. In the absence of real power, including the the military one, such foreign policy would inevitably be reduced to an endless submission of complaints which is more than useless. A noble calling for "humanizing of international relations" (Tsygankov, Andrei. "Vladimir Putins Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power," Post Soviet Affairs 21, no. 2, (2005). which are not supported by "soft" and "hard" power, can not be a realistic basis for the growth of international influence in the modern pragmatic and even cynical in many ways cruel world. And this is clearly confirmed by the latest developments in the Caucasus.episode of a Russian foreign policy development should be analyzed separately.

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASUS

foreign policy doctrine russia

Russia analysts observe that:

"Russias new central battleground is in Chechnya and increasingly in the rest of the North Caucasus, where it fights Islamist terrorists, separatists, and bandits." (Dmitri Trenin. "Reading Russia Right," Policy Brief #42 Special Edition. October 2005. Available online at #"justify">s southern rim breeds frustration, and leads to human rights abuses that only serve to attract new fighters to the cause. In the words of the Kremlins Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the "subterranean fire" of regional instability continues to rage unabated.(Ibid). For this reason the Caucasus will continue to be an area of vital national interest to Russia. The old East-West axis that pinned NATO forces against a massive Soviet conventional army is gone and the new era of the Southern offensive has been ushered in. The after-effect of the disastrous first Chechen war was a shift in strategic focus. As Dmitri Trenin noted:

"Central European plains were replaced by the Caucasus mountains (and potentially, the mountains and deserts of Central Asia); familiar peer enemies by primitive but deadly warriors; operations of groups of armies were replaced with a mixture of counter-insurgency operations, special forces engagements [and] police mopping up campaigns". (Dmitri Trenin. "Russias Foreign and Security Policy under Putin," Carnegie Endowment (2005)the longest border on Russian unstable Southern rift zone, Georgia has figured prominently in Moscows foreign and security strategy. Russian key interests in Georgia are characterized by efforts to ensure regional stability, retain military influence, "protect" the Russian diaspora and increase economic ties. Each of these goals is developed below to provide a glimpse of Russian view of the Caucasus.chapter then examines the cultural, diplomatic, economic and military means that Russia has used to advance its agenda in Georgia. Finally, these efforts are compared to the tenets of Tsygankovs Great Power Normalization model to determine whether they meet its criteria of a pragmatic Russian approach to foreign policy.

Regional Stability

Caucasus have historically served as a buffer between the Orthodox Christian empire and Muslim powers to Russias south. That geopolitical reality has not changed. With what Russians generally refer to as "Wahhabi" (Salafi) influence growing in Uzbekistan and inside Russia itself, Moscow is deeply concerned about instability in its "soft underbelly."source of the instability, Chechnya, is largely a secessionist crisis and the subject of Western criticism that Russias heavy handed military operations in the region created an environment where militant Islam could get a foothold. (Chechen rebels, looking for external sources of support, tapped into the international jihad movement to further their cause but while elements of Islamic extremism now exist in the region, the crisis began, and still is, largely a separatist struggle).has always been stung by this criticism and has sought to portray the Chechen conflict as part of the larger Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Continued incidents of violence in the Northern Caucasus have spread eastward from Chechnya to Dagestan and westward to Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and most recently, Kabardino-Balkaria where coordinated attacks against assorted federal and security installations rocked the capital city of Nalchik in mid-October 2005. ("Russias hot spots: Caucasian dominoes," The Economist. 15 Oct 2005. p54).

To Russias domestic audience such a spread of violence lends credibility to President Putins "domino theory" about how the whole southern region of Russia can be destabilized, potentially causing Russia to lose control of the strategic border region from the Caspian to the Black Sea. If this happens, the Kremlin argues, energy supplies from the Caspian basin will be in danger, and terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction technology will expand.(Ariel Cohen. "Competition over Eurasia: Are the U.S. and Russia on a Collision Course?" October 24, 2005. Heritage Lecture #901. Online at <#"justify">Military Influence

, like Armenia and Azerbaijan, contained remnants of the Soviet Transcaucasian Military District after the break-up of the USSR. After 1991, Russia assumed control of all former Soviet forces in Georgia, including approximately 20,000 ground troops and numerous vessels and bases of the Black Sea Fleet and Border Guards.many troops were subsequently withdrawn (troop strength from these units decreased from 20,000 to around 8500 by 1996) five bases and several strategically significant ports remained and Russia has been very reluctant to give up control of them over the past decade. In addition, while overall military strength was decreasing, the numbers of Russian soldiers in Georgias breakaway province of Abkhazia was increasing as Moscow supplied the bulk of peacekeepers that were mandated by the CIS to enforce the 1994 peace accords. Today, with the last two bases still in the process of closing and peacekeepers in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, approximately 3000 Russian troops remain in Georgia.

"Protection" of the Russian Diaspora

the Soviet Union collapsed, it left approximately 25 million Russians living beyond the borders of their ethnic homeland. In many cases these Russians had migrated to the former republics as part of Moscows nationalities strategy, a highly volatile policy whose divide and conquer methodology during the Soviet era spawned deep seated ethnic and political conflicts. Russian citizens now found themselves minorities in newly independent states without official safety lines to Moscow.was therefore very "proprietary" over states where ethnic Russian minorities became "stranded" outside the motherland. In Georgia, while ethnic Russians are the 2nd largest minority group, they represented only 6 percent of the population in 1989. In Armenia and Azerbaijan ethnic Russians number under 3 percent. (Rajan Menon, "Introduction: the Security Environment in the South Caucasus and Central Asia," in Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: the 21st Century Security Environment, ed. Rajan Menon, Yuri Fedorov and Ghia Nodia (New York: EastWest Institute, 1999), 11.)this minority was not a target of anti- Russian policies, Moscow nevertheless has used the security and well-being of the diaspora at least as rhetorical justification to strengthen Russian presence. While Russians in Georgia did not represent a political threat to Tbilisi or a security problem for Moscow, the Kremlin feared the economic impact of an exodus of Russians to Russia and the effect a potential conflict in Georgia might have on the Russian population in the North Caucasus. Fundamentally, the Kremlin believed that it must stabilize any conflict within Georgia (whether it directly involved Russian minorities or not) which might worsen inter-ethnic disputes within Russia itself. (Nicole J. Jackson. Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS (London: Routledge, 2003), 119).

Increase in Economic Ties

the time of the break up of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of wealthiest republics. Russian interests in Georgia included agriculture, especially in the semitropical Black Sea areas, coal mines, a major port in Sukhumi, railway links, and tourism, particularly in the resort areas of Abkhazia and Ajaria. Finally, Georgia was a significant transit point for Caspian oil and gas coming from Baku, Azerbaijan, as well as a source of hydroelectric power and minerals. Russias current foreign policy continues to focus on securing favorable economic relations and agreements, especially with regard to natural resource transit rights.

RUSSIAN MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE: EFFORTS TO USE DIPLOMACY, INFORMATION, SECURITY AND ECONOMICS TO ACHIEVE ITS INTERESTS IN THE CAUCASUS

oriented, liberal leaders such as Yeltsin, in order to separate Russia economically from the rest of the republics for the purpose of pursuing radical market reforms, sought to dismantle the Soviet Union and create in its place the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).Others, particularly the military and defense industrial establishment initially believed the formation of the CIS to be nothing more than a name change, a way to cast off the Soviet communist legacy without jeopardizing the fundamental political and institutional bureaucracy.the CIS was created in 1991 amid much turmoil and its nature was hotly debated by liberal reformers on the one hand and anti-reform neo-imperialists on the other Apart from the Baltic States, Georgia and Azerbaijan were the only two of the remaining twelve Soviet republics that did not initially join the CIS during its first year of creation. Both had been experienced strong nationalist movements and Moscows violent repression of political demonstrations during the Gorbachev era, and these crises discredited local communist efforts at forming any new "neo-Soviet" political unions.Despite their initial reluctance, both Tbilisi and Baku were coerced into joining the organization two years later when internal instability forced them to turn to Moscow for security assistance in the management of civil wars.Georgias stormy CIS initiation, and its orientation as one of the more independent minded members, Russia has frequently had stormy relations with the former republic, a trend that has deepened since the "Rose Revolution" that brought to power Western-leaning Mikhail Saakashvili.Moscow appears to have gained an upper hand in Central Asia, successfully orchestrating US withdrawal from a strategic base in Uzbekistan, as well as signing a historic mutual defense treaty with Tashkent, it does not appear to have made as significant inroads in the Caucasus and more specifically, its relations with Georgia appear to have become more combative since 2004.

Information / Cultural Mechanisms

a 2004 survey mapping the attitude of 1,472 Tbilisi residents toward different ethnic groups revealed a 64% positive rating for Russians, Moscows cultural mechanisms, such as its imperial legacy, media and language, appear to be largely ineffective in maintaining its influence in Georgia. (Statistical data reported in Eurasia Insight Study by Haroutiun Khachatrian entitled "Democracy still not Perceived as Priority in Caucasus" dated 23 November 2005. The study used data gathered by groups of public opinion pollsters in the three Caucasian capital cities in March 2004 under the direction of the Yerevan-based Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), a non-profit research institution sponsored by the Eurasia Foundation.) When faced with their imperial legacy, Russians generally believe the "periphery" is ungrateful to Moscow for bringing it "civilization." Not only did Russia bear the bulk of the expense of industrialization, it defended the periphery from external threats such as the defense of the Georgians from the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century. In contrast, residents of the Caucasus no longer perceive these efforts as vital or important. Today, their real concern revolves around Moscow's continued support for separatism in regions like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Business priorities, such as energy transit, oil, gas and electricity supply and migration, dictate attitudes towards Russia in the "near abroad" much more than historic memories do. For the younger generation, the importance of Russia as a destination for education and employment is diminishing, being replaced by the lure of most Western influences of Europe and even Turkey. A brief history of independence (from 1918-1921), the small percentage of ethnic Russians in the Caucasus, and the violent Soviet crackdown against rebellion in 1986 all serve to minimize the cultural influence that Russia can bring to bear.Central Asia, where there is very little indigenous free press and many residents listen to Russian media, the Georgian press is largely considered to be free, and journalists regularly criticize government officials and their conduct. While Tbilisi authorities finance some publications and operate the national state TV and radio networks, Georgians have access to western press and approximately 200 privatelyowned newspapers. In addition, only about 10% of Georgians speak Russian, further strengthening Georgian identity and a sense of independence. In contrast, in Central Asia, the Russian language is still widely spoken, especially in academic, political and business circles, and serves as the common denominator in educated discourse. In an effort to increase its "soft power" and counter perceptions that many Western NGOs in post-Soviet states promote national languages and the use of English as the new language of international communication, Russia has launched a new offensive consistent with a foreign policy of Great Power Normalization. The Kremlin has recently proposed that the free education quota for students from the CIS (currently set at 1%) should be increased, allowing more students from the Commonwealth of Independent States to get a free education in Russia's higher educational establishments. President Putin also spoke out against cutting the number of departments which Russian colleges and universities have in the CIS and announcing that Moscow State University isits network of branches in the Commonwealth of Independent States, an effortRussian leadership will facilitate. (FBIS article "Russian President Putin Calls for Closer Education Ties With CIS Countries." CEP20051025027193 Moscow RIA-Novosti in Russian 1102 GMT 25 Oct 05. Also see RFE/RL article by Paul Goble, "Moscow Plans Linguistic Counterattack in CIS.)

Diplomatic / Political Mechanisms

Russias cultural influence in the Caucasus may be weak, Moscow has several geopolitical levers it can use to influence its smaller neighbors, the most effective of which are their internal secessionist conflicts. A March 2005 EU country report, drafted as part of its neighborhood action plans, described progress toward reform in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and providing detailed overviews of their progress toward adopting EU values such as rule of law, democracy, and a market economy. The EU generally considers Georgia to be the most advanced of its Caucasian neighbors with relatively few problems identified in terms of domestic political reforms. Of note incriticism of both Armenia and Azerbaijan are breaches of fundamental freedoms, a general lack of willingness to reform and "widespread Russian influence on decision making in both Armenia and Azerbaijan." Perhaps emboldened by the EUs hesitation to become directly involved in helping resolve Georgias "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or assist in monitoring the border between Russia and Georgia, Moscow has continued to make the most of its political mechanisms. One includes its veto in the OSCE, an organization Georgia has sought to involve to a greater degree in its internal stability efforts. Since the establishment of a Georgian-South Ossetian ceasefire 1992, a four-party Mixed (or Joint) Control Commission has been responsible for monitoring and implementing the peace. The Commission is comprised of representatives from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and Russia's oblast of North Ossetia, a composition that seems blatantly biased toward South Ossetia. Georgia has long lobbied that the Commission in its current format is "ineffective" and that the OSCE and other international organizations should take a morepart in developing and implementing a peace process. In Georgias opinion, whenever Russia feels that the role of the Commission in the conflict resolution process is threatened, Moscow orchestrates a minor concession or position that demonstrates the Commissions utility to outside observers and ensures Russia continued political leverage. An even more potent lobbying tool is Moscows sponsorship of Georgias two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as well as those in Moldova and Azerbaijan). Both separatist regions are highly dependent on Moscow for support and therefore highly susceptible to Kremlin influence. Most South Ossetian citizens hold Russian passports and Russian laws provide the breakaway region with its legal code.regions ties with Russia provide it with what little economic activity exists in the area. Several Russian officials have even been appointed to posts within the breakaway regions government, which provokes concern in Tbilisi. In an interview with RIA Novosti, Georgian President Saakashvili was quoted as saying "when the chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) for [the Russian republic of] Mordovia is appointed as head of the South Ossetian ministry of security, and when the deputy chief of the Siberian military district is named as the South Ossetian governments chief military aide, then were not talking about regular personnel changes." Likewise in Abkhazia, many residents have Russian passports and the Russian ruble is also commonly used in trade.maintains peacekeeping forces there that act as guarantors of each regions defacto separatism from Tbilisi. "Because of its unrecognized status Abkhazia has few ties apart from its link with Russia. The CIS peacekeeping force that patrols the ceasefire zone is made up entirely of Russian Federation soldiers. To many (though by no means all) in Abkhazia, Russia is perceived as the one source of military and economic security to which they can appeal." Georgian experts believe that these regions continued dependence on Russia is a serious hindrance to the peace process.While the Kremlin does not currently formally recognize either regions independence, it maintains close political ties with their leaders. In September 2005, Moscow hosted the "self-styled leaders" of Georgia's breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Moldova's Transdniester and Azerbaijans Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. The representatives pledged to pursue independence and Russian lawmaker Konstantin Zatulin, from the Kremlin-directed United Russia party, called the sovereignty of these entities a "reality that should be accepted." Such behavior only serves to exacerbate the perception that Russia is anything but a "neutral" peacekeeper in Georgias conflict zones. With President Saakashvili having made resolution of Georgias frozen conflicts part of this campaign, his job security and political clout is tied to progress on that front. Russia on the other hand may be counting on the internal conflicts to lead to regime change, perhaps to a more accommodating, pro-Moscow leader, if voters become disillusioned about Saakashvili ability to reach agreement with the Russian backed separatist regions. As Georgia continues to edge closer to Western institutions, Moscow appears not to have backed away from political mechanisms as a means to keep Georgia off balance; however Georgias proximity to Europe allows it to counter the Kremlins influence with its own political levers such as the regional organizations GUAM and the Community of Democratic Choice. Georgia ands pursuit of different political alternatives for regional integration, options that do not include Russia (such as GUAM and CDC), further highlights their perception that Russias attempts at influence are not constructive, but self-interested, intended to maintain Moscows diplomatic mechanisms of influence.

Economic Mechanisms

to Energy Efficiency Center Georgia, a renewable energy consultancy sponsored by the European Union, Georgias domestic oil, gas and coal supplies only meet 20% of its annual demand. Unlike its oil rich neighbor, Azerbaijan, Georgia produces mainly hydropower, which provides enough electricity for the spring, summer and autumn when water levels are high. When water levels are low in the winter months, energy resources must be imported from Russia, Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Accordingly, one of Russias strongest mechanisms of influence in Georgia is economic, specifically energy. Rising oil prices and a monopoly over pipelines have allowed. Moscow to wield this tool very effectively. Two distinct strategies have emerged:, expansion of energy giants such as Gazprom through acquisition of shares in, or joint ventures with, foreign gas and energy related companies; second, control of energy prices through monopoly of transportation mechanisms. Both of these efforts are consistent with Tsygankovs Great Power Normalization. Under the Saakashvili regime Georgia has made tremendous strides to address theshortages that plagued the state since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Power fluctuations in the capital drastically improved over the years with only periodic blackouts in the fall due to faulty transmission lines and general disrepair of the electricity infrastructure. Outside the capital however, home to approximately 68 percent of Georgias population, areas would sometimes go several weeks or even months without power. Despite progress on its energy issues, Georgia is still vulnerable to economic pressure from Moscow. Russia views itself correctly as the "economic engine" of the CIS. It has been pushing for higher prices for its energy, which it had continued to supply to its former republics at discount rates since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Winter 2005/2006 gas war clearly demonstrate the ruthless nature of Russias energy agenda and added fuel to the accusation that efforts are politically motivated, targeting those countries the Kremlin has labeled as "disloyal," those who eschew a pro-Moscow orientation. In a closed door session with Kremlin politicians, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made clear that gas, oil and electricity were the countrys principal diplomatic resources, and implying that the "whole diverse arsenal of economic pressure tools" were going to be applied to insufficiently loyal CIS neighbors. The inconsistency in applying "market corrections" across the board to FSU customers without regard to political orientation undermines the pragmatic nature of Moscows policies. It is difficult to understand how economic liberalization and transparent bilateral arrangements (goals of Great Power Normalization) can be established when costly, imperial practices of subsidizing some select states energy needs still remain in place. The most effective demonstration of Moscows pragmatism would be a comprehensive, equitable phased approach to energy cost adjustments that would be transparent and more in line with fair market practices, but such a plan has not yet been articulated.

Military/Security Mechanisms

a 28 November 2005 meeting in Brussels with Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that "the door is open" for Georgias eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance and Georgia has expressed hope it might be among the next list of invitees expected to be announced in 2008. Georgia has signaled its intentions to pursue NATO membership and move toward closer alignment with the EU. Aside from its economic mechanisms of influence, Russia continues its ability to sway Georgian policies by playing upon the states most significant weakness, its internal instability. Three primary sources of tension in the area of security exist between Moscow and Tbilisi: the issue of border monitoring along their common border; the continued presence of Russian military bases on Georgian territory; and the intractable secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to Tsygankovs model, these types of issues should be secondary to economic interests, or at least should be characterized by cooperative bilateral or collective action oriented at tackling mutual security threats, but relations with Georgia do not resemble this paradigm. Because Russias cultural influence on the Caucasus is weak, Moscow has to maximize its other mechanisms to achieve its desired outcomes in the region. Efforts in the economic realm have yielded significant ties to the energy infrastructure of the Caucasian states but lack a real sense of cooperation and joint effort.invading the territory of South Ossetia, Georgia, with the connivance (or rather, patronage), the U.S. simply ignored the international law. UN Security Council proved to be helpless, and of little authority by refusing to condemn the aggression. Russia was trying to prevent war until the last moment but was obliged to take adequate measures to protect its peacekeepers and the people of South Ossetia from the Georgian aggressors, which it did. Thus, the military force was again become the supreme arbiter of world politics. By applying it Dmitry Medvedev revised to some extent the approved on July 12 2008 (three weeks before the start of the conflict) new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which has not withstood the collision with reality. The main thing is that neither this concept nor the subsequent statements of the President of the Russian Federation does not solve the problem of national identity of Russia. Unfortunately, not only America, the whole world is still unable to figure out what is Russia: brand new unknown state, which arose on the map only in 1991, followers of the Soviet Union who voluntarily "cut" its territory and changed the planned economy to the "wild market economy" or the successor of millennial Russia? The prolonged absence of reasonable responses to the questions: "What is Russia?" and "What is its place in the world?" leads to the strengthening of suspicion from the West on whether it has to deal with the former Soviet Union or a parody of it, and therefore hinders the project of integrating Russia into Europe and the transatlantic community in general. Therefore, in Europe and the U.S. Russia has been perceived as a country "which is in a state of transition " at best. Self-identification is difficult problem, because it is associated with a very painful breakage of the Soviet mentality. However, without such self-identification, as mentioned above, intelligible internal, or, especially, foreign policy is impossible. Furthermore, it is impossible basically to formulate the national interest without it. Lack of self-determination is the main reason why Russia has not yet revealed whether it is ready for an alliance with the United States in order to solve strategic problems of international security and to create a new world order with it. It did not make a strategic choice, with whom it wants be "enemies and with whom to be friends." This is the point the main problem of Russian-American relations, for example. Thus, Russia has not yet determined itself. Russia does not have a coherent foreign policy. And since there is no strategy, there is no understanding of national interests. There can be no vertical power structure without "vertical sense." This raises some questions, for example, whether Russia acted imprudently or even carelessly when it joined (or embarked on the path to accession) the Organization of Islamic Conference? After all, in general, this step is in stark contrast to the declared partnership with the United States and the EU. This means that Russia can not make a choice not only between East and West, but also between North and South! That is what a lack of strategy and the weakness of the state of subjectivity turns into. Of course, there is no clear foreign policy strategy among the number of other great powers, namely the United States. But unlike them, Russia does not possess today such "safety margin", which insures even from serious mistakes and failures. Therefore vagueness of the foreign policy strategy for it is a luxury. The second fundamental problem of Russian foreign policy is that its crisis has an institutional character.comes to the lack of an effective mechanism for the preparation, adoption and implementation of foreign policy decisions. The third problem lies in the fact that Russian foreign policy is not based on a system of strategic planning, which should provide a miscalculation of the short, medium and long term options for foreign policy decisions, the proportionality of goals and means.

(Welt, Cory. "Realism, Russia, and Conflict Resolution," PONARS Policy Memo 348, November 2004, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)absence of such a system (the Russian Federation Security Council of the Strategic Planning Group do not count) which should be relying on solid analysis, in fact, led to a crisis of Russian foreign policy. Miscalculation of proportion of foreign policy ambitions and capabilities (resources) of the country, the inability to understand the nature of the processes occurring in the world, the perception of them through the prism of traditional views applied in the Soviet period, has led to the fact that none of the strategic objectives set by the political leadership of Russia in the last 20 years has not been achieved.has failed to prevent any expansion of NATO or to build a real partnership with the Alliance, as well as to maintain the desired level of relations with the countries of CEE and the Baltic region. All the beautiful programs of building the European security, in particular through the mechanisms of the OSCE, have remained on paper. The NATO operation against Yugoslavia took place in defiance of Russia, and persistent support for the regime of Milosevic after his defeat turned to the loss of Russian influence in the Balkans.ABM Treaty has not been secured mainly because Moscow has refused to negotiate its modifications. Negotiations with the U.S. on further nuclear arms reductions have been suspended. Previously declared the concept of strategic partnership with the United States hung in the air. The idea of Primakov regarding the creating a "strategic triangle" among Moscow-Beijing-Delhi has failed completely. Russia was in fact displaced from the settlement of processes in the Middle East, Korea, and now the Iraqi. Russian relations with the second economy in the world - Japan continue to be at zero, as has been mentioned above.none of the strategic plans for the CIS Collective Security Treaty and the post-Soviet space had worked. This applies not only to the Union of Russia and Belarus, but also the Russian-Ukrainian relations and partnership with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus (especially with Georgia).significant progress has happened in the most important matter for Russia- integration into the world, especially European, economic space and attraction of massive foreign investment in the Russian economy (comparable, for example, with investments in Chinese economy). Substantial, although not the main, cause of the crisis of Russian foreign policy is a noticeable drop of its reputation in Europe, America and the world at large. It is regrettable to state, but it was in 2004-2008 years when Russia has ceased to be an attractive partner even to its neighbors. It was during these years when everyone heard a really flurry of criticism - largely fair - regarding the so-called "managed democracy," "authoritarian tendencies of the Putin regime," "dishonest" and "unfair" parliamentary (2007) and presidential (2008) elections, "selective justice" (Yukos case), the police methods of pressure on big business, destruction of channels and publications unwanted by the Kremlin, appointments of leaders of the CPSU and the KGB to senior government positions in the Russia, consolidation of public safety institutions without any sort any control by the Parliament and the public, infringement of federalism, etc., etc., etc. …if in the old days, perhaps people could give a damn and say, "let them slander on our most democratic and humane system", but today, in full transparency of the modern world, this "trick" would not pass. Since it is impossible to carry out one sort of policy within it's own borders, and fundamentally different - beyond it's borders.has shown that the semi-feudal relations in many spheres of Russian domestic politics are incompatible with the post-industrial architecture of the external environment. The environment of the Euro-Atlantic space in which Russia wants to integrate. Such a "split" of the political consciousness of the Russian establishment will lead to no good and, in case of its obstinate reproduction will put an end to the prospects of the country as an equal and respected "players" in the international arena.2004-2008. Russian leadership, however, tried to snap in the good Soviet tradition to give a "proper rebuff to detractors." Moscow has accused the OSCE of double standards and the excessive attention paid to the former Soviet republics, threatening to stop funding this organization. In December of 2004 the Russian President has already spoken about the "dictatorship in international affairs packaged in beautiful pseudo-democratic phraseology wrapper," and on dangerous "attempts to reconstruct modern civilization on the principles of the barracks of a unipolar world."Vladimir Putin accused the West of hiding behind the ideals of democracy, saying that it represents 'kind, but strict uncle in a pith helmet who shows people the expediency by which they must live," and "if the native would object, he will be punished with rocket and bomb clubs, as it had been done in Yugoslavia." (Billington, James H. Russia in Search of Itself (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2004).February of 2007 the famous Munich speech by Putin had been made in which he accused the West (largely truthfully) in the collapse of the system of international security and the arms control regime. However, the effect of tightening (though only verbal) of course from Moscow was clearly not the one which it had hoped for. Criticism of Russia and Putin personally in the Western media has only intensified.if prior to 2005, his "friends" namely Bush, Chirac, Blair and Schröder refrained from direct attacks on Russia, it gained momentum in the coming years criticism of the Kremlin's new course on the part of Western elites in many ways contributed to the fact that the European "friends" of our President lost their positions to more conservative leaders (Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown) and the U.S. government was forced to recognize the error of their overly optimistic expectations about the democratic transformation of Russia and to revise relations with it in Washington the position of the conservative wing had significantly strengthened that had its influence on the U.S. election campaign:in the coming years, one can predict a serious cooling of Russian-American relations with high probability. In light of all these events the question of "rivalry" between Russia and the EU in the post-Soviet CIS countries, for example, which is the subject of the agenda of many international conferences which are taking place in Europe, in fact, is wrongful. Because there is no real competition. EU puts its European project on the scales. Suppose that it is not too ambitious (wealth and prosperity for all members of the "European family") but it is quite attractive. And Russia, for its part, has nothing to put on the scales because it does not have its historical project and it can not teach their neighbors of "sovereign democracy", especially it can not ensure their economic prosperity especially in alliance with itself. That is why Russia is unattractive to the CIS countries., Russia has abandoned its project (the victory of world Communism) and publicly stated that it will integrate into the global community, ie in another project. What it wants from its former satellites? In fact substantially it itself declared, "qualifier" for those who will enter into a Greater Europe sooner. To whom can it get offended?all for "integration into the global community," no one requires the mediation from Russia. This is the root cause of all the failures of Russian foreign policy in the region of former Soviet Union. It impossible to count on the success of integration of this regions around Russia, if it continues to be unattractive and perceived by all as the "sick man of Europe" but also decline from its own historical project of its own history. And it should be very clear that the "orange revolutions" in the CIS countries is nothing but a pseudo-selection of the European historical project by those countries which, unfortunately, has not yet been chosen by Russia itself. The country can not be attractive if according to the induces of the World Economic Forum it occupies the 58th place in global competitiveness index, on the index of competitiveness for business - 71-th, the quality of health care - the 53rd, the innovative potential of - 60-th, the quality of education - 55-th on the efficiency of public institutions - the 116-th, and the scale of corruption - one of the first places in the world (these scopes has increased by 10 times in 2000-2004). ( Heleniak, Timothy. "Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia," Demokratizatsiya 9, no. 4).long as Russia does not hold a successful national modernization, at least create the preconditions for the transition to an innovative type of development does not generate institutions of mature (and not "sovereign") democracy will not in fact (and not in words) become the welfare state with all its attributes - quality and affordable health care, education, pension and housing - as long as it does not defeat the corruption and tyranny of bureaucrats - it is unwise to count on a successful foreign policy in the former Soviet Union region and in other parts of the world. Finally, an important cause of the crisis of Russian foreign policy is its poor staffing, the degradation of the diplomatic service, related largely to the fact that the profession of a diplomat in Russia (as distinct from all other countries in the world and, incidentally, the former USSR), is not prestigious primarily because of its low financial security.increase of 3-4 times has not solved the problem: now a diplomat with 15 years of experience receives an amount equal to salary of young secretary-typist in the average level company. This means that talented young people can not see for themselves as an application to the Russian Foreign Ministry and chooses a more prestigious and wealthy professions. As a result, the Foreign Ministry in particular accumulates the people who just did not make it in business or in politics. Behind the few remaining veterans of Russian diplomatic service, which passed a brilliant school of Soviet foreign ministry (who had a clear view of national interests, well-defined by V.Nifontovym as "imperial pragmatism" V.Nifontov. The foreign entity in terms of underfunding. - APN, 27.05.2005) are no qualified and enthusiastic young individuals standing. This, in turn, means only one thing: Russia is destined to continue to lose to its partners and opponents on the international arena. "At the present time - as political analyst V.Militarev rightly points out - Russian diplomacy is one of the deepest crises in its history." One can say that currently, Russian foreign policy is absent. More precisely, Russia have no foreign policy which works as the megamachine, operating in autopilot mode. It is the foreign policy of great powers. Such a foreign policy goes far beyond the scope of direct central government directives. In carrying out these directives, it is not limited by them. It goes beyond them without violating them. Such a foreign policy is based not on the directives and not even on officially accepted concepts of foreign policy, but the internal sense of the national interests of their country by each responsible diplomatic employee as part of his job competence. This understanding is based on the one hand on the concrete analysis of the situation in the host country, on the other - on the notion that national interests are strategic, long-term and global and are placed beyond the current political space-time. And this is a foreign policy Russia does not have as of today. The question whether Russia had a foreign policy during the Soviet period is not completely clear, although it is obvious that the foreign policy of the imperial period have been clearly formulated. Today, in post-Soviet period, as was mentioned, Russia does not have it. There are only central directives that are poorly executed, the concept of Russian foreign policy, which none of the diplomats, apparently perceive seriously and foreign policy on the Russian president's steering. In other words, today the Russian president is not the only subject, but largely also the only actor of foreign policy. (V.Militarev. What kind of foreign policy we need. - APN, 23.05.2005.)the current crisis in Russia's foreign policy should not be dramatized. In general, crisis of the system is good if it is followed by steps for its radical renewal and modernization. And this period in Russian history is not the worst in order to make these moves in foreign policy. Under the condition of finding solution for these problems, Russia has a chance for completely successful foreign policy. In subsequent chapters of this paper options for remedy of the situation in foreign policy aspect will be offered.

The forecast for Russia: optimistic scenario

medium-and long-term forecasts for Russia's development - both domestic and foreign - are generally pessimistic. Predicts looks like the same set of "horror" movies: the demographic decline and fall of the quality of human capital, economic and technological degradation, the decline of democracy and a return to totalitarian methods of government, etc. etc. As a consequence - the country rolls in the category of third countries in the world, with its subsequent dismemberment and division "of the Russian heritage" by the more successful international actors - China, U.S., EU,?Japan and even the Islamic countries. Possible scenario. But it is not the only one. The benefit of it is that it must mobilize the nation to actions for preventing its implementation. However, for proper alignment of these actions not hysteria, and even emotions but cold and sober assessment of the current military-political situation are necessary, basing on which alone it is possible to build realistic forecasts of the world in general and Russia in particular. Such assessments, of course, would be made in very general terms What is the short, intermediate and long-term forecast of development of military-political situation in this context? In the short-term the external threat to the Russian Federation is not great.is hard to imagine that in the coming years any state of the world would attempt a military aggression against Russia. Although NATO has become the dominant military power in Europe, Russia does not have much political or economic conflicts with the countries of the alliance with the potential for unleashing the large-scale war. During this period, Russia will retain the status of nuclear power. Presumably, the regime of arms control would not be completely destroyed, which would provide a predictable military-political situation in general as well as adequate strategic warning and, in effect, would eliminate the danger of surprise attack.general, the possibility of external military aggression is far less of a threat for Russia now than the internal socio-political instability, economic and technological degradation, environmental and technological disasters. It should be recognized that the main threat to the vital interests of Russia today does not come from outside, but are the result of processes occurring within the state and the territory of former Soviet republics. Accordingly, the priorities of Russian national security objectives should be to place as follows.the first place there are internal political and social objectives - protection of individual rights and freedoms, the construction of the foundations of civil society and effective government. The second is provision of an innovative model of economic development, global competitiveness, improvement of the welfare of the citizens., in the third place is the need to protect these gains against threats from outside, ie, the containment of external aggression and ensuring of conduct of vitally important interests outside the national territory. Over the intermediate term (5-10 years), an external threat to Russia could rise primarily in the South. With the growth of Islamist extremism, after 5-6 years Russia may be facing a serious instability in the region of Central Asia.political means will not be enough to prevent a confrontation with the Islamic world, there would be a possibility of worsening conflict with some Muslim countries seeking to achieve dominance over a wide geographic area from Bosnia to Tajikistan. Destabilization of Central Asia is the next challenge. However, Russia can not get stuck in the unpromising regions of the southern part of the former Soviet Union. Excessive concentration of state efforts on these relatively important, but secondary areas will divert material and intellectual resources from more profitable and promising areas of policy development.the worst case scenario, Russia could face with multiple wars, on the scale of Afghanistan one, on its territory or the territory of the CIS. As for the West and East deterioration there can not be ruled out but a direct military threat is unlikely. However, renewed confrontation between Russia and the West can not be excluded completely. There is another problem linked to this matter: the apparent desire of the West to weaken Russia as a competitor in the global market. This is exemplified in high-tech, not to mention the arms trade. All promises of aid to Russia are immediately replaced with tough declarations as soon as it comes to the redistribution of spheres of influence in the global market.Russian integration into the global economy which is controlled by the West is inevitable, it may be carried not on an equal basis and in international economic organizations Russia will continue to be kept "in the lobby." It should also be taken into consideration that in the medium-term perspective the role of nuclear weapons in national security probably will decrease and during this period the United States will go to build and equip its armed forces with weapons of "fifth", and then the "sixth" generation (the latest high-precision conventional weapons with a strong information component) with which they can solve any military problem practically in non-contact method.will hardly be able to compete in this aspect with the U.S. The deployment in the next 10 years of not just tactical missile defense systems capable of solving the problem of struggle against some (but not all) of the strategic forces of Russia, but also elements of the territorial defense system by the U.S. can not be excluded. Over the medium term the emergence of serious conflict between China and Russia allies in the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) is possible as well as between China and neutral Mongolia which is important to Russia. Although there is currently no reason to anticipate any aggressive intentions on the part of China, a number of objective factors can not completely dismissed as the possibility of serious conflict between China and Russia which could create security problems for the Russian territory (Transbaikal and Maritime).most difficult task is to give a long-term prognosis. If attempts in creating a regional security system in Europe and Asia-Pacific region will not succeed and there would be no possibility to strengthen mechanisms of ensuring global security under the auspices of the UN the resumption of typical polycentric system of international relations acute rivalry between the new centers of power with their attempts to establish dominance over the regions of vital importance for Russia can not be ruled out. Under these conditions the absence of a balanced and long-term geo-economic strategy based on the latest foreign policy and foreign technology means that Russia would be facing expulsion to the periphery of global economic development. The greatest potential threat to the new Russian state - especially after the two military campaigns in Chechnya - is the formation of a hostile and sometimes violent relationship by a number of states along the borders of Russia and possible involvement of a local and regional armed conflicts of various sizes. This, first of all, comes to the regions bordering the former Central Asian republics and Transcaucasus. The greatest danger to preserving the integrity of Russia and to ensure optimal conditions for political and economic reforms is the risk of economic isolation of some regions, particularly the Far East, Kaliningrad and Karelia from Russia and creation of some sort of cordon sanitaire which would move Russia farther away from the most developed and economically promising partners in Asia - Japan, South Korea, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and in Europe - Finland. Of particular concern in this respect is the continuing depopulation of Siberia and the Far East. This process is not accompanied by a deliberate government policy on attraction of investment and people there on a new basis.regions - a strategic reserve of Russia - could turn into a geo-economic zone, and then the territory of geo-strategic vulnerability. Rather than a source of growth for Russia, Europe and Asian countries, this area could become a source of instability and an object of great power rivalry. Finally, there is a risk (albeit seemingly unlikely now) of a scenario that has already been attempted to implement in 1917 - the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union's sphere of influence of Japan, China, European Union, Turkey, the United States and other major powers. If that happens, Russia will be discharged into the geopolitical oblivion. It would be simply divided "in pieces" by other centers of power.course, this is the worst scenario possible. And there are all preconditions to avoid it.

Russia in the emerging new world order

is rapidly building its national identity of the twenty-first century and it ought not, as a great power, fuss and panic about natural processes taking place in Europe and the West in general, the more certainly about doomed messianic pretensions of so far the only remaining the world's superpower. Using a generally favorable international situation for the solution of their problems at home ground, saving their strength, in some cases taking a waiting position, Russian politicians at this stage have to follow the words of Otto von Bismarck: "A politician can do nothing by himself. He should just wait and listen until long he could hear through the noise of events the steps of God, and then rush forward to grab the edge of his robes ." (Bismarck, A. Vol. T. 2, p. 98.)

However, Russia has quietly and firmly assert and defend the national interests by taking part in the European and international affairs as much as possible. And the most important national interest of Russia at the short and long term is the maximum economic rapprochement with the West (for laws of the market economy is universal) formation of a unified Euro-Atlantic security space (which implies a close military and political cooperation with major countries), while maintaining its own unique cultural and civilizational component. It is important to note that this issue is far from irrelevant for the citizens of Russia. All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center at the nationwide survey had asked respondents the following question: "What should be the main goal of Russian foreign policy over the next 10-15 years?"is following: 31% of respondents believe that Russia should regain its superpower status, 23% think that it is important to enter the top five most developed countries, 16% of Russian citizens believe that the country should abandon the foreign policy ambitions and concentrate on solving domestic problems; 12% reckon that Russia should enter the number of economically developed countries such as Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan and others, 6% of citizens believe that the main goal for the near future is to become a leader within the CIS, 5% of respondents believe that the most urgent issue for Russia is to become the leader of a large bloc of states opposed to U.S. global claims. 7% of respondents found this question difficult to answer. (Profile magazine. 2001. № 29, p. Two.)September 2006 aat the meeting with a group of Western political scientists of the debating club "Valdai" in response to one of their issues Putin said: "I would prefer to get away from the terminology of the past years," Superpower "- this is what we used during the "cold war. Why it has to be "great power", "superpower"?

This statement gave cause to some local and Western media to raise the issue of Russian refusal of the superpower ambitions. Many political scientists such as S. Belkovsky began saying that the ruling elite does not think about the greatness of Russia or the restoration of the country. At one stage of the discussion there was clarification in the words of the President that he was referring to the nuclear potential of the state.issue should be sorted out. Should Russia claim the great power status? Or try to restore the superpower status, which had the former Soviet Union to re-challenge the U.S. (after all, the term "superpower" is closely associated throughout the world exclusively with these two countries)? It should be noted that no matter how one treats the Soviet Union, in the minds of the vast majority of Russian citizens (and all post-Soviet states) its collapse due to a sense of loss. Loss of a great and powerful state. And so-called "Day of National Independence" - June 12 did not become a happy national holiday. Because people are still incomprehensible, its independence from what and who championed the former RSFSR and why you need to celebrate the day when "Russia withdrew from Russia."any Russian politic should take into account the fact that the ideal of a strong state deeply rooted in the minds of the Russian people, which was associated with the Soviet Union, but not the current RF, devoid of the dissolution of the Union of so many advantages - the second one (in terms of GDP, but of course not as effective) economies of the world, a huge military power, political influence and world power, half the population, besides the historical and ancestral lands. Of course, the desire to revive the Soviet Union in its present form in current society is miserable. As the results of polls shows the majority of Russian citizens would not agree with the return of Russia to superpower status if it was accompanied by deterioration of the current plight of the people.decrease in number in the last decade of supporters of the unification of Russia with all the CIS states is connected with it. Nevertheless, the majority of Russian people and the political elite wish to see their state as well respected and considerable country among other influential states. Which subsequently explains a significant and widespread growth of the "sovereign" sentiment in the community peoples' interest in the discussion of political scientists and experts of the "sovereign democracy", an "energy superpower", etc. Under these conditions the possible loss of great power status by Russia is perceived as a loss of independence the ability to influence not only other states but also the processes within the country. Due to these and many other causes positioning in relation to Russia as a great power today is an important guideline in the reference system of self-identification of Russian citizens. The level of expectations for a strong state is still high and a deep distrust of the power structures largely due to the fact that these expectations were unrealized because of the fact that the state condition continues to be weak. So any humiliation of Russia attempted to cast doubt on its status as a great power is perceived by the Russian society in extremely painful manner.ideal of "the greatness of Russia" remains one of the fundamental national values not only in political rhetoric but also in the national consciousness. But whether Russia is a great power? This provision both in the West and in Russia itself is constantly being questioned. Typically references are made regarding economic indicators relating to its share of world income and world trade, the structure of foreign economic relations, the per capita GDP, the economic structure of Russia and so on. Without a doubt, economic and military-political situation of the Russian Federation in the modern world simply is not comparable to the situation of the Soviet Union. Until 1989 the Soviet Union had a second economy in the world.GDP was at least 60% of U.S. GDP (and the volume of industrial production - 80%) and four times the GDP of China. In 2008, despite the notorious economic crisis, the economical growth was averaging at 7% a year, after the default in 1998. Russia's GDP by nominal potential of 6% of U.S. GDP (purchasing power parity - 10%) and 18% of China's GDP (in PPP terms - 24%). It should be added that, according to several local economists, the economic growth of the Russian Federation in 1999-2008. was largely reductive and largely determined by the growth in world energy prices, which does not increase their production in tonnes (oil) and in cubic meters (gas), but increases their cost, which consequently increases the rate of nominal GDP. Russian share in world energy is definitely very high: 10.3%. However, Russian share in the innovation economy of the world in which it wants to integrate is disastrously insignificant - 0.3%. According to the CIA in 2008 Russia's GDP reached only 77% of the GDP of the RSFSR and 47% of the GDP of the USSR in 1989, while per capita, respectively, 94.4% and 80%. At the current pace of economic growth in Russia only after five years of Russia GDP will surpass the GDP of the RSFSR in 1989. (CIA World Factbook 1990 and CIA World Factbook 2008.)data from the IMF, given by the known Russian economist V.Kudrov indicate other highly unfavorable reality to Russia - a significant decline in its share of world GDP, compared with 1950 and by 56.2% compared to 1990 - 44 8%. (V.Kudrov Place of Europe in the global economy. / / Modern Europe. In 2000. № 2). If in 1985 the USSR's foreign debt was only $ 20 billion (4.6% of GDP), now foreign debt of Russia amounts at 460 billion dollars. (36% of GDP). By some critical level of vital signs and Russia is still in a very deplorable situation: food securityit depends on imports by 50% (the critical level of 30%), while Moscow and St. Petersburg is dependent on imported food at 90 %, and other major cities of Russia - on 70%, the consumption of pure alcohol in Russia is 16 liters a year per person (the critical level - 8 liters), the gap of living standards in different regions in Russia as high as 25 times (the critical level - 5). Not less than disappointing is the performance of Russia in the global competitiveness. At the World Economic Forum in 2007 out of 131 countries in the world, Russia has taken only 58th place. The top ten included the U.S., Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Singapore, Japan, Britain and the Netherlands. At the same time post-Soviet countries have occupied the following places: Estonia - 27, Lithuania - 38, Latvia - 45, Kazakhstan - 61, Uzbekistan - 62 Azerbaijan - 66, Ukraine - 73, Georgia - 90, Armenia - 93, Moldova - 97, Tajikistan 117 Kyrgyzstan - 119. Global Competitiveness Index is of 12 components: quality of institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher education and vocational training, goods market efficiency and services, labor market efficiency, well-developed financial market, technological level, the size of the market, competitiveness, innovation potential. Russian competitive advantages have been identified by WEF in the following areas: macroeconomic stability, higher education, labor market flexibility, the size of the market, innovative capacity, and the main problems identified in areas such as health and primary education, infrastructure, quality of institutions and services, goods market efficiency and services, competitive companies.the index of competitiveness for businesses (companies' competitiveness and quality of business climate) Russia ranked 71st. Thus, in the sphere of management of enterprises there is a low overall qualifications of managers, especially financial; business schools are bad and knowledge of foreign languages by employees is insufficient. The weak competitive advantages are the marketing efficiency of production processes, control costs, human resources management, general management of companies. In the field of technology the ability to perceive innovation is low, intellectual property protection is virtually non-existent, technology transfer is not adjusted by means of foreign direct investment and licensing of foreign technologies. The infrastructure distinguished by weak development of modern communication and insufficient investment in telecommunications, while the latter, along with information technology represent the main areas of technological development.activities of the government suffers from exposure to interest groups, from the inefficiency of public expenditure. Tax policy needs radical improvement, since the practice of tax evasion became widespread. Regarding the magnitude of per capita GDP, Russians found themselves on 46th place in the world. On all of these indicators Russia is currently losing not only to the major industrialized powers of the world but to many former Soviet republics. The current economic trends do not output country even in the "golden dozen" of the first quarter of the XXI century. However, in terms of purchasing power parity, according to the Russian government in 2008, the state has become the seventh economy in the world. But only eleventh at the nominal potential (CIA World Factbook 2008).to this indicator (which is more objective than PPP) in terms of GDP Russia is 10 times lower than the U.S., nearly five times lagged behind China and two times behind Germany and India, being thrown into the second top ten countries in the world. On this basis, many Western politicians encourage their governments not to "stand on ceremony with Russia" and to pursue policies without regard to Russian national interests. As Zbigniew Brzezinski once said, "a country with an economy the size of Holland, ought not to think about geopolitics." (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 293.)statements are extremely short-sighted and do not correspond to the realities of world politics which are taking shape. It is no accident that the West itself, recognizing the potential political weight and economic strength of Russia, has included it (not Brazil, not Indonesia or even India and China) in the "Group of Eight", ie the eight leading countries of the world. However, in this case other factors has played a role: an understanding by Western leaders that without participation of Russia it is impossible to solve many problems of global security and development as well as their desire to turn Russia into the community of democratic states. In its political significance, intellectual power and influence on the course of world affairs, including as a permanent member of UN Security Council and the consequent liability status, Russia remains one of the great powers. In addition to this, as well as the geopolitical and geostrategic position, making Russia a "axial region of the world", and the presence of nuclear weapons (and in this area Russia is actually the second "superpower" of the world), the main features, enabling under current conditions to consider Russia great power, are the opportunities and prospects in the field of resource provision, rather productive and intelligent population which to this day possess a high scientific and technological capacity and several others.are the factors, i.e. size of the country, its technological capabilities and human capital, the availability of virtually all types of raw materials and resources, an objective (but until now only potentially) that make Russia one of the major world centers. Equally important for the positioning of Russia in the modern world is the fact that it has a solid historical capital, of course, if it considers itself heir of millennial Russia. Of course, all these positions are not provided automatically. They might be lost if the country in the coming years does not overcome the deficient raw material orientation of the economy and move to an innovative type of development. On the contrary, capabilities of Russia to provide high quality lives of citizens and to influence the course of events in the world will be expanded under condition of successful solution of these problems posed by the political leadership of Russia. As for the index of competitiveness, the WEF used, they are certainly not absolute and may be applied to all countries with the same yardstick. Large countries such as China, India, Brazil, France, Russia can not be defined as competitive under the same criteria as, for example, Estonia and Switzerland. For large countries much more important issue is the preservation of nationally-organized society (the state), i.e. organic integrity of the system, which takes much of the national economic and political resources. Such a system has special properties that can not be deduced from the properties of individual elements. More precisely, its objectives can not be the resultant of the objectives of individual elements:these are the own goals of the system.conclusion is that for large countries, which include Russia, the national competitiveness includes the country's ability to maintain their subjectivity in the context of globalization. For Russia this means the need to remain one of the world's centers of development, one of the great powers of the world leaders in twenty-first century. This seems to make sense and it is assigned as the task of Russian political leadership - to bring Russia into a the number of these world leaders. However, solving of this problem requires serious measures that would ensure preservation of Russia "core self" - a set of machine-building industries, capable of a modern technological basis to reproduce themselves and play the other branches of engineering, is not involved in self-development, especially for the defense industry, the growth of human capital - the quality and quantity, and strengthening social cohesion, foreign support for the position of world leader (open and hidden).main thing is that this problem requires policy makers, with the horizon of vision that goes beyond the election period. Competitiveness is a complex phenomenon, for the understanding of which the standard univariate approach s not applicable. It is necessary to create a competitive advantage of a high level. At the same time an abundance of traditional factors of production is not a sufficient condition for long-term success, only the constant innovation and increasing productivity are critical conditions of the country's competitiveness. The competitiveness of goods and services is understood as the ability to sell them at market prices with a normal profit. External competitiveness is mainly supported by the Russian oil, gas and metals.of its finished products, except weapons, are not competitive on world markets. With the products available the position of Russia holds partly in the CIS markets. Exports of services does not match the scale of the economy. As for the internal competitiveness, what was preserved to date in the domestic economy produces goods that are competitive in the domestic market. Adapting to the market conditions has occurred at a high price. But the prospects in general are not very optimistic it is impossible to accept the the current state. Vigorous efforts are needed in order to make a difference. Russia is one of the richest countries in the world on natural resources. Thanks to them this state now has an excellent balance of trade and can offer competitive commodity and energy prices on the world market. And this is meant for the long term: the high share of exports of such kind of goods would be characteristic for Russia forever. But in this situation has its drawbacks: the dependence on the situation of unstable world markets and, more importantly, the weakening of incentives for the development of innovative economy, the structural and institutional changes that are important to maintain a high level of adaptability and the development of the country's citizens.the workforce and human capital Russia is in a relatively favorable position: it posses the high level of education combined with staff being unpretentious regarding pay level and working conditions. But at the same time there are usually claims to the discipline and rigor in execution of work. The demographic crisis will eventually increase the shortage of labor which would require the involvement of migrants. Free labor would not be available, competitiveness on the labor market should deteriorate. This means that large-scale investment projects aimed at increasing production, will experience difficulties with staffing or will introduce them in other sectors. Russia is doomed to rely on increased productivity and efficiency. Capital usually goes to the sectors which are considered attractive - oil, gas, trade, real estate, and even then subject to the availability of suitable borrowers or recipients of investment, credible, and those who are inclined to cooperate. In order to diversify it is necessary to investment in other sectors which are non-competitive and risky today, which often have to deal with non-cooperative behavior with people who are not ready to exchange controls on investment. Market mechanisms of capital overflow, which are virtually absent in Russia are in these cases prove themselves to be ineffective. The paradox is that the country needs large investments to upgrade but now is not able to accept and apply them in best possible way. In contrast to the recent past, when there has been a lack of financial resources, currently are growing risks of inefficient and insecure investments, pushed by the pressure of liquidity including the influx of petrodollars. At the same time, Russia today possesses basically just "short" money. "Long" money needed for large-scale long-term projects, including infrastructure, are not yet available and the national institutes of savings such as pension funds, insurance companies, etc. are just being formed. Capital formation in them will take at least ten years. It takes time for the development of financial intermediaries and to inculcate the culture of massive medium-sized investments to the public. The lack of a "long" money makes the large-scale foreign investment an appropriate involvement in the modernization of industry therefore providing them with a competitive investment climate. An increase in the use of these resources, including the capital itself, as happened in the past, will not provide the rapid growth and competitiveness. The main competitive advantages of the Russian economy are, in addition to natural resources and sufficiently educated and skilled labor force, the accumulated scientific and technical capacity, transport capacity, transit capacity, relatively large domestic market. However, the existing competitive advantage has not only failed to develop, but also degraded as a direct consequence of the destruction of the old economic system and the incomplete transition to a new one. And yet expert assessments of Russian competitiveness are overly pessimistic, and reflect to a large degree only personal views of experts. The country has a set of economic, social and political factors, reflecting the accumulated competitive potential, its material and intellectual wealth, and therefore Russia should define a strategy for enhancing competitiveness and to develop a mechanism for its implementation. In order to improve the competitiveness Russia should move to a new economic policy, a new economic program of modernization of the economy the core of which would be an innovative strategy and computerization. It is also important to reduce production costs, improve product quality, increase investment in high-tech sector of the economy and in science. Moreover, the competitiveness ranking is a not only an economic problem but also a branding one. Russia needs to develop its own strategy for inclusion in the global economic system that would cover a range of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment. It is necessary to maximize the global experience of economic reforms aimed at creating an effective competitive economies which would be included in the global economic system. Indispensable prerequisite for an effective foreign economic activity in the country are creating of favorable business environment, ensuring the growth of purchasing power as a necessary factor in reviving the production and consumption. The degree of external openness of the Russian economy should be based on the assessment of readiness of its main sectors of the productive capacity to compete in the global and domestic markets. This involves carefully tuned interrelated combination of course on the liberalization of foreign trade activity with selective protectionist measures. Political and economic problems of the country at present are the development of external economic relations in such a way that they contribute to economic growth, greater integration into the world economy and efficiency and competitiveness of Russia in the world. In general, the limits of openness of the national economy in the process of integration into the international community lies in the sphere of protection of national interests and must have certain limits. In the context of globalization, Russia needs a new quality of strategic management and planning at the macro, meso and micro levels ensuring the creation of a modern financial and banking system, the institutions of a market economy corporate governance arrangements, which create favorable conditions for improving the competitiveness of domestic producers in both domestic and in foreign markets. Today there is a need to develop and implement the strategy of "rapid development" of the Russian economy. Currently it represents a symbiosis of different technological structures and the changes in dynamics of scientific and technological potential of the country would depend on ability of Russia to initiate economic growth, to implement a forced upgrade in order to ensure near-term competitiveness of the economy.an open economy, the imperative of its strategic stability is the presence of a competitive structural core - a group of technology-related industries, focused on domestic demand and exports. Moreover, reliance on domestic sources of growth strengthens the requirements for competitiveness: the expansion of domestic demand involves strengthening of the national currency, which, with all other things being equal, affects the competitive position of producers. Such a stable model of economic development can be defined as "a model of accelerated development," capable of ensuring the political image and competitiveness of the state in international relations. The implementation of the requirements of this model means that in the next decade it would be necessary to combine the growth of consumption (which depends on the expansion of domestic demand), with a large-scale modernization of production and technical staff, which requires a sharp, approximately double, increase in investment flows for compensation of depreciation of outdated production facilities and updating of infrastructure.unfolding situation requires a breakthrough investment, which is a key link in the modernization strategy aimed at forming strategic sustainable economy that would increase its competitiveness in the global arena. Estimation of the overall competitive potential of Russia suggests that it has a major economic factors of competitiveness, as the long-term (industrial, scientific, technical, labor and natural potentials) and short (opportunistic) type (the situation with the exchange rate) for the implementation of the proposed concept of "advanced development" based on the inclusion of countries in the international division of labor based on the priority development of its existing competitive advantages of a high order. The combination of the existing production and scientific-technical potential of highly skilled and relatively cheap labor force the colossal in its scale and diversity natural resource base, in the aggregate represent a unique competitive advantage. Thus, all prerequisites for the modernization breakthrough and ensuring a competitive edge to Russia are available at the moment. Russia's population in general is characterized by relatively high levels of education and culture. Among the employees is high proportion of skilled workers and professionals. In other words, Russia is a developed country on the industrial and post-industrial stage of development, elements of which have ripened in the depths of the military-industrial complex of the former Soviet Union. Russia's productive forces are qualitatively different from the productive forces of the Third World and, conversely, not fundamentally different from those that are in the West. In Russia, the same type of skills, the same class of machines.problem is that Russia has long been dominated (though most of the historically conditioned) by a different mentality, a culture of labor relations, other industrial relations and other social organization and these factors interfere with the goal of reaching productivity level of the west. To catch up with the U.S., Germany, France, in per capita GDP would require probably decades. But as for countries such as Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Chile, that is, countries that are essentially at the same stage of development of productive forces as Russia, their GDP per capita (respectively - the level and quality of life) in case of successful structural economic reform (and they have not yet begun) can be achieved in the foreseeable future, perhaps by 2020.should be a sensible, realistic economic outlook in Russia for the next 10-12 years. All this allows to characterize Russia as a great power, which is undergoing large-scale temporary economic difficulties caused by changes in the economic, geopolitical and geo-economic situation and the transition to a new type of social development. Preservation and rational use of available internal resources provides the potential for early recovery and transition to a model of innovative (post industrial) development. In general, positive changes in the world provides opportunities for solving this problem. If and when Russia would adopt new social relations, finally improve the labor moral in the perspective of the absolute size of the production it will be well able to once again achieve the highest international standards, or even surpass them. Then Russia will be attractive to its neighbors, which can stimulate the integration processes in the former Soviet Union. If we assume that there would formed an economic community of the largest among the newly independent states around Russia, it opens the possibility to recovery of the economic potential of the class which the Soviet Union has had. If it will not happen soon or not happen at all, the situation should not be overly dramatized. Loss of the status of "superpower" does not deprive the country of opportunities for social progress and prosperity, in fact, may stimulate the growth of these opportunities. The collapse of the Soviet Union, as emphasized by President Putin, was certainly, "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century." First, the exhaustion catastrophe during which the civilized community had worked out its potential and civilizational fate occurs or the death of civilization. Secondly, there is a shift catastrophe during which the mechanisms of society influence on the elite and nomination of minority control by society become ineffective. And thirdly, catastrophe of inversion in which there is degeneration of the control systems with preserving the national identity. The collapse of the USSR it's a shift catastrophe to some extent and the inversion one to another. But it is the exhaustion type. So it's a disaster which is recoverable. Now Russia has all the facilities to ensure not only the survival of the Motherland, national security, social development, but also the dignity of the individual and his fundamental rights and freedoms, a well-being for an individual and his family. For one thing is the struggle for world domination, which was fought between the Soviet Union and the United States and demanded enormous expenditures and another thing is provision of its national security and development, which requires from Russia much lower cost and effort, but that determines its very physical existence.idea of global expansion in the geopolitical and territorial aspects is depleted to the bottom by the Russian people. Thus, the question of whether or not Russia should claim the great power, should be answered - yes, it should. But it should not be the role of a superpower, competing on an equal footing with the United States (with the end of the Cold War, this concept is indeed a thing of the past), but rather, as an equal partner among the "top five" world's leading powers, which corresponds with the task appointed by V. Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. It is an objective process which is natural for Russia it is simply impossible to ignore that. It necessary to be aware of the great difficulty of solving this problem as well as new risks, challenges and threats that Russia would face on its way and fierce competition with other power centers of the modern world. It is also clear that without a strong and friendly Russia West would be unable to create a stable and predictable world order of the next century.Russia would be mindlessly repelled into the camp of marginals, the entire international system will hangs in the air, deprived of a solid support. Reliance of Washington on its military force will not work (and no longer works, as shown by events in Iraq). The weakening of Russia will inevitably lead to a sharp deterioration of the military-political situation in the CIS countries, Baltic countries, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and as a consequence, in Western Europe and around the world. It will then become a real threat of total geopolitical instability in Eurasia. A weak Russia is the subject of the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, the booming China and some short-sighted representatives of Western countries. Those who are now seeking to destroy the Eurasian geostrategic monolith and relegate Russia to the status of third-rate power in Europe and Asia are leading most dangerous game.